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VIII. CONCLUSION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Existing California judicial precedent uniformly holds that damages 
recovered1 by a married person based on the wrongful death of a relative of 
the married person during the marriage2—and while the spouses were not 
living separate and apart3—is entirely community property.4  Under the 
theoretical basis for this community property classification, it is irrelevant 
that the person tortiously killed was a child or grandchild only of the 
plaintiff- or payee-spouse and had no legally recognized relationship to that 
party’s husband or wife, who becomes owner of half the recovery because of 
its classification as community property.5  This Article rejects this 
community property classification of all components of wrongful death 
recoveries as illogical. 
 
 1.  This Article refers to recovery of wrongful death damages without distinguishing between 
situations where a plaintiff-spouse recovers through a wrongful death judgment after litigation and 
situations where a plaintiff-spouse recovers based on a settlement agreement made with the 
tortfeasor or the tortfeasor’s insurer.  Whether the legally appropriate classification of the recovery is 
separate property of the plaintiff-spouse, community property, or a mix of both separate and 
community property could not turn on the difference between recovery after completed litigation and 
recovery based on a settlement agreement with the tortfeasor. 
 2.  In the balance of this Article, when reference is made to recovery of wrongful death 
damages by a married person, it is to be assumed, unless stated otherwise, that the recovery is based 
on the death of a relative of the spouse that occurred during marriage and not before the marriage. 
 3.  According to section 771 of the California Family Code, “accumulations” by a married 
person “while living separate and apart from the other spouse” are separate property of the acquiring 
spouse.  A wrongful death recovery should be such an “accumulation[].”  More importantly, a cause 
of action in tort for wrongful death arising at the time the plaintiff-spouse’s relative is tortiously 
killed will be viewed as such an “accumulation[].”  Thus, the courts will examine whether the 
plaintiff and his or her spouse were living separate and apart not at the time the funds constituting a 
wrongful death recovery were received by the married person, but at the time of death of the relative 
of the plaintiff-spouse upon which the cause of action asserted is based.  So, if Husband and Wife 
are living apart and litigating their divorce when Wife’s child is tortiously killed, the pair divorce but 
later remarry, and thereafter Wife collects $1 million from the tortfeasor based on the child’s death, 
the recovery is separate property by tracing the money back to the arising of the cause of action for 
wrongful death at a time section 771 was applicable.  It is assumed in the balance of this Article that 
section 771 has no application to any discussion concerning a wrongful death recovery by a husband 
or wife (or a former husband or wife) unless the living-apart doctrine is specifically mentioned. 
      4.    See discussion infra Part III.A–B. 
      5.    See discussion infra Part III.A–B. 
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The line of precedents requiring this community property classification 
for wrongful death recoveries dates to a 1922 decision by a California court 
of appeal;6 the decision held that a married person’s wrongful death recovery 
should be classified in the same manner as recovery based on personal 
injuries tortiously inflicted on the body of that person during marriage.7  The 
law in 1922 concerning classification of recoveries based on a married 
person’s tortiously-inflicted personal injuries rested on an 1891 California 
Supreme Court decision8 that was viewed—not unreasonably—as holding 
that no portion of the personal injury recovery (which was presumptively 
community property because it was acquired during marriage) could be 
classified as the victim-spouse’s separate property by tracing it to a separate 
property source other than the tort cause of action itself.  For example, if a 
victim-wife had her leg—which was part of her before marriage and hence 
her separate property, if viewed as property—sheared off in an accident 
negligently caused by a tortfeasor,9 tracing the money damages to the 
separate leg would be impermissible.10 
In the absence of an applicable statute, the approaches judges take in 
classifying recoveries based on personal injuries to a married person have 
changed substantially since 1922.  A relatively new theoretical approach, 
which can be called “in-lieu tracing,” is now often applied.  It asks what was 
lost by the victim-spouse that resulted in a recovery.11  For example, if an 
insurance company pays benefits to a husband on a disability policy and the 
husband cannot work due to metastasized cancer but is beyond normal 
retirement age, the payment is seen as in lieu of retirement benefits.12  Thus, 
the law applicable to classifying retirement benefits as community or 
separate would be employed, i.e., the payments would be traced to the 
premiums paid for the insurance.13  If no statute precluded application of in-
lieu tracing, a personal injury recovery based a spouse’s lost leg in a 
tortiously-caused accident during marriage would be classified by tracing the 
money to the leg—something the victim-spouse brought to the marriage.14  
The amount of the total recovery based on the loss of the leg would be the 
 
 6.  Keena v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 207 P. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922).  See infra text accompanying 
notes 55–63. 
      7.    Keena, 207 P. at 37–38. 
 8.  McFadden v. Santa Ana, O. & T. St. Ry. Co., 25 P. 681 (Cal. 1891).  See infra text 
accompanying notes 24–36. 
      9.    See infra Part II.A. 
    10.  See infra Part II.A. 
    11.  See infra Part VI.A–D. 
 12.  See Saslow v. Saslow (In re Marriage of Saslow), 710 P.2d 346, 352 (Cal. 1985); infra Part 
VI.D.2; see also Elfmont v. Elfmont (In re Marriage of Elfmont), 891 P.2d 136 (Cal. 1995). 
    13.  Saslow, 710 P.2d at 357. 
    14.  See WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 146 (1980). 
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victim’s separate property, even though the cause of action arose and 
payment was made during marriage.15 
This Article concludes that modern in-lieu tracing precedents require 
overruling the 1922 wrongful death decision and its progeny that bar 
potential tracing of a married person’s loss based on the death of a relative to 
a separate property source and that erroneously compel classifying all 
components of damages recovered as community property.16 
Conversely, another line of older authority under which all wrongful 
death recoveries had to be classified as community property does not need to 
be overruled.17  This line of cases began with a 1924 court of appeal 
decision18 and was based on language then found in section 376 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure (Section 376).19  The 1924 court’s 
interpretation of Section 376 was unsound from the outset, as this Article 
demonstrates.20  In any event, in 1949 the statute was amended and the 
language was removed; this necessarily abrogated the second line of older 
precedents that mandated classifying 100% of a wrongful death recovery by 
a married person as community property.21 
II.  DEVELOPMENT OF CALIFORNIA’S ORIGINAL NO-TRACING RULE 
EMPLOYED IN CLASSIFYING PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERIES IN GENERAL 
A. The 1891 McFadden Decision 
The line of cases dealing with classification of wrongful death 
recoveries by a husband or wife that began in 1922 rests on a judicial 
borrowing of the approach used in classifying personal injury recoveries. 
Thus, analysis of the pertinent law properly begins with the earliest cases 
classifying property as community or separate when determining who should 
recover damages for a spouse’s personal injury, e.g., a concussion suffered 
in an automobile accident.22 
 
    15.  Id. 
    16.  See infra Part VII. 
    17.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 18.  Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond Granite Co., 226 P. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924).  See infra  
text accompanying notes 71–85. 
    19.  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
    20.  See infra Part IV.B. 
    21.  See infra Part IV.D. 
    22.  See McFadden v. Santa Ana, O. & T. St. Ry. Co., 25 P. 681, 681–82 (Cal. 1891). 
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The first reported decision to consider how the community property 
system23 applied to classify damages recovered by a husband or wife based 
on his or her tortiously-caused personal injuries was by the California 
Supreme Court in 1891.24  In McFadden v. Santa Ana, O. & T. St. Ry. Co., a 
married woman was in a vehicle—described as a “three-spring buggy, 
without a top”25—that fell into the defendant’s unmarked and negligently-
created street excavation 
whereby Flora McFadden sustained great injuries in her person, and 
internal injuries by which her womb was displaced, and by reason 
of said injuries to her person and said internal injuries, she was 
confined to her bed for many months, and endured great physical 
and mental suffering.  Her health is injured and impaired 
thereby . . . .26 
A judgment for the plaintiff-wife was reversed because the jury had 
been instructed that her husband’s contributory negligence could not be 
imputed to her.27  The trial court had refused the defendant’s request for this 
instruction on the ground that the wife’s recovery would be her separate 
property.28  Since it would not be co-owned in community with her husband, 
his contributory negligence would be legally irrelevant because the husband 
would not profit from his own wrong.29  But the California Supreme Court 
held that the trial court erred in declaring that the wife’s recovery would be 
her separate property and held that 
 
 23.  It followed two peculiar decisions of the California Supreme Court that declared that a 
wife’s cause of action in tort for personal injuries was her separate property under the common law 
of England in effect in California.  Matthew v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 63 Cal. 450, 451 (1883) 
(negligent starting up of train caused wife to be violently thrown to the floor of a car; “[t]he cause of 
action is hers.”); Sheldon v. Steamship Uncle Sam, 18 Cal. 526, 533–34 (1861) (false imprisonment 
caused injuries to wife and under “common law” she was “entitled to [compensation]”).  It is hard to 
imagine how all of the justices participating in both of these cases could have forgotten that at the 
time of these decisions the state constitution contained a provision, CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 14 
(1849), that required application of the civil law to marital property issues.  This constitutional 
proviso had been vigorously debated at the initial constitutional convention before its adoption and 
constituted a major exception to the state’s adoption, in general, of the common law.  See J. ROSS 
BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF 
THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 1849, at 257–69 (1850), excerpted in 
REPPY, supra note 14, at 9–12. 
    24.  McFadden, 25 P. at 681. 
 25.  Transcript on Appeal at 34, McFadden v. Santa Ana, O. & T. St. Ry. Co., 25 P. 681 (1891) 
(No. 13,919). 
 26.  McFadden, 25 P. at 682 (emphasis added).  The treating physician testified that the victim-
wife suffered “an anti-flexon of the second degree, combined with prolapsus.”  Transcript on 
Appeal, supra note 25, at 38. 
    27.  McFadden, 25 P. at 683. 
    28.  Id. at 682. 
    29.  Id. at 682–83. 
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[t]he right to recover damages for a personal injury, as well as the 
money recovered as damages, is property, and may be regarded as a 
chose in action . . . and, if this right to damages is acquired by the 
wife during marriage, it, like the damages when recovered in 
money, is . . . community property of the husband and wife (Civil 
Code, §§ 162–164, 169[]) . . . .30 
The court was willing to trace the money the injured spouse received back to 
the cause of action but would not trace the cause of action back to the 
victim’s body.31  When McFadden was decided in 1891, California Civil 
Code section 162 provided, “All property of the wife, owned by her before 
marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent, 
with the rents, issues and profits thereof, is her separate property.”32  Section 
164 then provided, “All other property acquired after marriage, by either 
husband or wife, is community property.”33  If money damages were 
received during marriage, it is clear that the McFadden court did not view 
section 164 as barring classifying the victim-spouse’s damages as separate 
property by tracing them back to a tort cause of action that arose before 
marriage—“property owned . . . before marriage” under section 162.34  The 
possibility of other kinds of tracing seems not to have been considered. 
Four years later, the California Supreme Court expanded upon the 
significance of sections 162 and 164 as they then read in classifying personal 
injury damages.35  The 1895 case involved personal injury damages arising 
out of an assault on a married woman, and the court held: 
The separate property of the wife is declared in section 162, Civ. 
Code, to be “all property owned by her before marriage, and that 
acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise or descent”; and section 
164, Id., declares that “all other property acquired after marriage” 
by the wife is community property.  Whatever may be the law in 
other states, in this state the separate property of the wife, which is 
 
 30.  Id. at 682 (some citations omitted). 
    31.  Id. 
    32.  This quote was taken from former section 162 of the California Civil Code which is now in 
section 770 of the California Family Code.  In 1992 section 770 was enacted by section 10 of the 
Statutes of California, replacing section 5108 of the California Civil Code.  In 1969 section 5108 
was replaced by section 164 of the California Civil Code via section 9 of the Statutes of California. 
    33.  This quote was taken from former section 164 of the California Civil Code which was 
renumbered as section 5110 of the California Civil Code in 1969.  In 1992 section 5110 was 
repealed when it became Section 760 of the Family Code. 
    34.  McFadden, 25 P. at 682–83.  
    35.  Lamb v. Harbaugh, 39 P. 56 (Cal. 1895). 
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acquired by her after marriage, is limited to such as she acquires by 
“gift, bequest, devise and descent.”  As a right of action for 
damages for a personal injury is not acquired by either of these 
modes, it is a part of the “other property acquired after marriage,” 
and is therefore community property.36 
B. Precedents and Secondary Authority Existing When McFadden Was 
Decided 
In McFadden, the cornerstone decision for the judge-made rule that 
100% of personal injury damages arising out of a tort during marriage must 
be community property, counsel for the victim-wife made no argument in 
brief for a separate property classification.  Instead, counsel argued that the 
fact the husband would own half of the wife’s recovery in community was 
not a sufficient basis for imputing the husband’s contributory negligence to 
the wife.37  It is not surprising that counsel for the wife did not seek a 
separate property classification.  Although the issue was res nova in 
California, all the then-reported precedents from other community property 
states that had considered the matter had held that a spouse’s personal injury 
damages had to be entirely community property because they were acquired 
 
 36.  Id. at 58.  In Washington, when the law there also classified 100% of a married person’s 
personal injury recovery as community property on precisely the same logic as employed in Lamb, 
the courts there quaintly said they were applying the “waste basket definition of community 
property.”  Brown v. Brown (In re Marriage of Brown), 675 P.2d 1207, 1210 (Wash. 1984) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“‘This “waste basket” definition of community property results in 
property being characterized as community unless it meets the definition of separate 
property. . . . [F]ortuitous acquisition of damages for personal injury by a third party tort-feasor is 
community property because it does not fit within the definition of separate property.’” (quoting In 
re Marriage of Parsons, 622 P.2d 415, 416 (Wash. App. 1981))).  Brown ultimately overruled the 
cases that took this approach.  Lamb cited the 1891 McFadden decision.  Lamb, 39 P. at 58.  In 
several other decisions on the books in 1922 (when the issue of classifying a wrongful death 
recovery was first decided in a reported decision) the court classified a married person’s personal 
injury recovery as community property and cited McFadden, including Doyle v. Doyle, 186 P. 188, 
190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919), and Justis v. Atchison, T. & S. Railway Co., 108 P. 328, 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1910). 
 37.  In their petition for a rehearing, Respondents argued that the negligence of the husband there 
should not be imputed to his wife: 
[T]o say that the negligence of the husband should be imputed to the wife for the reason 
that the judgment secured for the damages sustained by the wife is community property, 
is not a sufficient reason.  
 We cannot say that it is a common undertaking because the results of that undertaking 
may in some way accrue to the benefit of another party.  In order to identify the party 
having this resulting interest in this judgment as being connected in a common 
undertaking with the other plaintiff, there must be something other and further than this. 
Petition for a Rehearing at 4, McFadden v. Santa Ana, O. & T. St. Ry. Co., 25 P. 681 (1891) (No. 
13,919). 
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during marriage by a process other than inheritance, bequest, devise, or 
gift.38 
In 1890, when McFadden was briefed and argued, there were two 
English language treatises in print on the law of Spain and Mexico39 that 
included discussions of community property law40 and that had been cited by 
the California Supreme Court as good sources of civil law principles.41  
Neither treatise addressed whether a recovery of damages for personal 
injuries by a married person was community property or the victim’s 
separate property.  One did suggest that, as a matter of civil law procedure 
(which would not be part of California law), if the wife were the tort victim, 
she was a necessary party in a suit for damages and she could not appear in 
court without her husband’s permission, although the court could compel 
him to give his assent.42 
 
 38.  See Holzab v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. Co., 38 La. Ann. 185, 188 (1886); Cooper v. 
Cappel, 29 La. Ann. 213, 215–16 (1877) (dictum); Loper v. W. Union Tel. Co., 8 S.W. 600, 602 
(Tex. 1888); Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 331, 332 (1883) (personal injury recovery not acquired by 
gift, bequest, or descent), overruled in part by Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 395 (Tex. 1992). 
 39.  GUSTAVUS SCHMIDT, THE CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO (1851); 1–2 JOSEPH M. 
WHITE, A NEW COLLECTION OF LAWS, CHARTERS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, 
FRANCE AND SPAIN, RELATING TO THE CONCESSIONS OF LAND IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COLONIES; 
TOGETHER WITH THE LAWS OF MEXICO AND TEXAS ON THE SAME SUBJECT (1839). 
 40.  See SCHMIDT, supra note 39, tit. I, ch. IV, at 12–14; Ignacio Jordan De Asso Y Del Rio & 
Miguel Manuel Y Rodriguez, Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain (Judge Johnson trans., 1839), in 1 
WHITE, supra note 39, bk. 1, tit. VII, cap. 5, at 60–63.  
 41.  See, e.g., Braly v. Reese, 51 Cal. 447, 463 n.a1, 464 n.d1 (1876) (citing SCHMIDT, supra 
note 39; WHITE, supra note 39); Wilson v. Castro, 31 Cal. 420, 433 (1866) (citing SCHMIDT, supra 
note 39); Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576, 604–05 (1860) (citing WHITE, supra note 39). 
 42.  Asso & Manuel, supra note 40, at 272 (“[T]he wife cannot appear in suit without the 
permission of her husband, . . . and the judge may also, with cognisance of the cause, obligate the 
husband to give his assent.”).  Conceivably the wife was viewed as a necessary party because the 
damages would be her separate property; but she also could have been a necessary party so the court 
could have before it the very person claiming to have been tortiously injured, even though the 
damages awarded would be community property subject to the husband’s management, and for 
which, in most situations, he would be the party to bring suit in court.  De Funiak writes that in 
Spain, by the sixteenth-century, a wife could sue for her own personal injuries without obtaining her 
husband’s consent.  WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY § 81, at 198 (2d ed. 1971).  In the same passage de Funiak quotes the Spanish statute 
book, Las Siete Partidas, which he dates as of 1263: “Wrong or dishonor [i.e., a tort] can be 
committed against any male or female of any age whatsoever.”  Id. at 49.  Based on this, de Funiak 
concludes: “Thus, the injury to the person of a wife was compensable to her to the extent that her 
property was injured or destroyed.”  Id.  By “compensable to her,” de Funiak intends to say that at 
civil law in Spain the recovery was the wife’s separate property pursuant to Las Siete Partidas.  I do 
not think Law 9—from which de Funiak quotes—supports this conclusion.  Law 9 actually goes on 
to say, “[A] father can bring suit for damages for dishonor done to his son . . . and a husband can do 
this in behalf of his wife.”  5 LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, UNDERWORLDS: THE DEAD, THE CRIMINAL, AND 
THE MARGINALIZED 1356 (Robert I. Burns ed., Samuel Parsons Scott trans., 2001) (emphasis 
added).  If any inference concerning classification is to be drawn from Law 9, this language could 
indicate that the recovery for the wife’s personal injury damages would be community property 
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Nor, apparently, did legal treatises written in Spanish—that the 
California Supreme Court had, before the 1891 McFadden decision, been 
consulting to determine the fine points of civil law of marital property—
address the issue concerning classification as community or separate 
property of personal injury damages.  I have personally translated43 the 
chapters on community property (bienes gananciales) in two of such 
treatises44 that were most frequently cited by the California Supreme Court.45  
Neither treatise discussed or even alluded to whether under civil law a 
recovery of personal injury damages would be classified as community or 
separate property. 
 
managed by her husband.  De Funiak also cites a commentary to Law 55, Leyes de Toro, for the 
proposition that a wife could sue without her husband’s consent for her personal injury damages, 
suggesting this was so because they would not be community property.  The passage cited, as 
translated by myself and Sandra Newmeyer, Duke Law School class of 2011, states: 
Here, doubt is shed on whether a wife is required to show the husband’s permission in 
order to defend in a criminal trial, in which she is accused.  It is resolved by Acevedo, 
number 108, that common usage has established the lack of need for such permission, 
even if it is contradicted by our [statutory] law.  But it appears to me that, without 
contravening the disposition of the law, one can say it is unnecessary to require the 
permission of the husband, because it can be supplied by the trial judge, and furthermore 
in that case the woman is required to satisfy the charges that have been brought against 
her.  And when it is necessary [for the wife] to convey her property rights, it is 
recognized by Acevedo in number 81 that the husband’s consent is not necessary; for the 
same reason it is unnecessary in this case [i.e., of a criminal prosecution].  This becomes 
evident in light of what is provided in Laws 77 and 78, which state that for a crime the 
married woman may lose in part or in whole her possessions of any type.  The laws (77 
and 78) prove without doubt that the present law and other laws that favor the husband, 
which require his consent so that the woman can convey and acquire property, have no 
effect, since otherwise one would have to say that the application of Laws 77 and 78 
depend on the voluntary act of the husband, who would surely never give his consent for 
the conveyance of the wife’s properties.  
2 DON SANCHO DE LLAMAS Y MOLINA, COMENTARIO CRITICO-JURIDICO-LITERAL A’ LAS OCHENTA 
Y TRES LEYES DE TORO, COMENTARIO A’ LEY 55 DE TORO 178–79 (Madrid, Imprenta de Repulles 
1827).  To me this says no more than that a wife managed her own separate property. 
 43.  With help from numerous Duke Law School students over the past thirty years who were 
fluent in Spanish. 
 44.  These treatises are Josef Febrero’s Libreria de Escribanos and Joaquin Escriche y Martin’s 
Diccionario Razanado de Legislacion Civil, Penal, Commerical y Forense.  Each appeared in 
various editions.  The editions I translated from were the 1834 edition of Febrero published in 
Mexico City and edited by Eugenio Tapia and generally referred to as “Febrero Mejicano” (often 
abbreviated in court citations as “Feb. Mej.” or “Feb. Mex.”), and the 1831 edition of Escriche 
published in Paris.  See JOSEF FEBERO, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOSÉ INSTRUCCION JURIDICA TEORICO 
PRÁCTICA DE PRINCIPIANTES tit. XI, cap. X, at 217 (1834); JOAQUIN ESCRICHE Y MARTIN’S 
DICCIONARIO RAZANADO DE LEGISLACION CIVIL, PENAL, COMMERICAL Y FORENSE 71 (1831).  De 
Funiak disparages Febrero as a mere notario, not a scholarly Spanish jurisconsult.  WILLIAM Q. DE 
FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 26 (lst ed. 1943).  Yet Febrero’s treatise was 
apparently widely available in California in the middle of the nineteenth-century and frequently 
consulted by lawyers and judges. 
 45.  Illustrative cases include Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 488, 499, 502–04, 515 (1851) (citing 
Tapia’s FEBRERO, supra note 44, and ESCRICHE, supra note 44), and Fuller v. Ferguson, 23 Cal. 
546, 565 (1864) (citing FEBRERO, supra note 44, on a community property issue). 
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C. Tracing Separate Property Through Mutations 
In the absence of any useful secondary material or judicial precedent 
dealing specifically with the classification of personal injury damages as 
separate or community property, the best theory that the wife’s counsel in 
McFadden had for seeking a separate property classification was that the 
damages awarded constituted a “mutation” of an item of separate property 
the wife brought to the marriage: her womb—part of her own body—which 
was injured in the accident.  The theory would have involved recognition of 
three mutations: (1) a healthy womb transformed into a damaged womb 
together with a cause of action in tort; (2) the cause of action transformed 
into a judgment; and (3) the judgment converted into money.  This mutation 
theory had some support in an 1866 decision of the California Supreme 
Court and certainly was worth pursuing.46  It was unhesitatingly applied in 
1938 in a case where the wife’s tortiously-damaged separate property was an 
item of tangible personalty—a motor vehicle—rather than a part of her 
body.47  Applicability of the tracing-through-mutation theory might have 
been more apparent to the wife’s attorney in McFadden had her leg 
(arguably her separate property and certainly not community) been sheared 
off and she sought damages in part so that she could buy a prosthetic leg to 
replace the natural leg.48 
 
 46.  Peck v. Vandenberg, 30 Cal. 11 (1866), stated the law of California to be (quoting from a 
Texas decision) as follows: 
“[T]o maintain the character of separate property it is not necessary that the property of 
either husband or wife should be preserved in specie or kind.  It may undergo mutations 
and changes, and still remain separate property; and as long as it can be clearly and 
indisputably traced and identified, its distinctive character will remain.” . . . Of course, to 
trace the property through its “mutations and changes” . . . requires evidence other than 
written . . . . 
Id. at 38–39.  In Peck the court favorably discusses a Louisiana case, Dominguez v. Lee, 17 La. 295 
(1841), where the mutations of separate property went from something tangible to a cause of action 
and back to something tangible.  Peck, 30 Cal. at 30.  The wife’s tutor (surely a fiduciary) had 
embezzled some separate property funds the wife had inherited.  She settled her conversion cause of 
action against the embezzler by taking, during marriage, a grant of land from him, which was held to 
be her separate property by tracing back to the inheritance.  Id. 
 47.  Scoville v. Keglor, 80 P.2d 162, 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938) ($600 recovery for damages to 
separately owned car segregated from balance of negligence case award to wife for her personal 
injuries, which was community property).   
 48.  It does not necessarily follow that the prosthetic leg would remain community property 
when attached to the wife if it was purchased with community funds.  The law might apply the 
fixtures doctrine to that situation, under which a structure paid for with community funds and built 
on a spouse’s separate property becomes separate property and creates a right of reimbursement in 
the community.  See Warren v. Warren (In re Marriage of Warren), 104 Cal. Rptr. 860, 862–63 (Ct. 
App. 1972).  A somewhat stronger case for applying the fixtures doctrine than the removable 
prosthetic leg would be $10,000 of gold embedded in a spouse’s teeth as a result of extensive dental 
work paid for with community funds.  If the other spouse were to die with a will leaving all property 
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III.  APPLYING THE RESTRICTED TRACING RULE OF PERSONAL  
INJURY DECISIONS IN THE CLASSIFICATION OF  
WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY BY A SPOUSE 
A.   The 1922 Keena Decision by the Court of Appeal 
Between 1891 and 1922, the California rule that 100% of personal 
injury damages awarded to a married person had to be classified as 
community property was repeatedly adhered to,49 but developments outside 
California during this period initiated the formulation of what is now the 
overwhelming majority rule: the damages are part separate and part 
community depending on the nature of the loss compensated by each 
component of the damages.50  A 1902 Louisiana statute that seemed on its 
face to classify 100% of a wife’s personal injury damages as her separate 
property51 was judicially construed as permitting a community classification 
for the amount of the damages reimbursing the community for medical bills 
incurred by the victim52 and the amount of damages based on wages she lost 
due to the injury.53  Additionally, a treatise published in 1910 proposed that, 
as a matter of judge-made law, part of the award for personal injury damages 
be traced to a “right violated”—a right to personal security—that was 
separate property of the victim-spouse.54 
 
over which he or she had testamentary power to children of a prior marriage, it would be almost 
absurd for the law to recognize the legatees as owners of a half interest in the gold-infused dentures 
affixed to the mouth of the surviving spouse, an outcome avoidable by application of the fixtures 
doctrine.  
 49.  See, e.g., Paine v. San Bernardino Valley Traction Co., 77 P. 659 (Cal. 1904); Henly v. 
Wilson, 70 P. 21 (Cal. 1902). 
    50.  See, e.g., Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 102 P.2d 627, 628–29 (Nev. 1940). 
 51.  1902 La. Acts 68, amending article 2402 of the Louisiana Civil Code to add the following 
exception to the basic definition of community property: 
But damages resulting from personal injuries to the wife shall not form part of this 
community, but shall always be and remain the separate property of the wife and 
recoverable by herself alone; “provided where the injuries sustained by the wife result in 
her death, the right to recover damages shall be as now provided for by existing laws.” 
 52.  Picheloup v. Gibbons, 120 So. 504, 504–05 (La. Ct. App. 1928).  A Texas court made a 
similar miraculous interpretation of a statute dealing with classification of components of a recovery 
based on a married person’s personal injuries.  First enacted in 1968, what is now section 3.001(3) of 
the Texas Family Code provides that separate property of a husband or wife includes “the recovery 
for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage, except any recovery for loss of earning 
capacity,” quoted in Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 391 n.1 (Tex. 1972), from former section 
5.01 of the Texas Family Code—which was repealed in 1997 and itself was formerly article 4651 of 
the Texas Civil Statutes.  Notwithstanding the plain legislative choice not to make an exception to 
the basic rule classifying the damages as separate property for the amount of recovery based on 
medical expenses incurred, Graham held: “To the extent that the marital partnership has incurred 
medical or other expenses and has lost wages, both spouses have been damaged by the injury to the 
spouse . . . . The recovery, therefore, is community in character.”  Id. at 396. 
 53.  Simon v. Harrison, 200 So. 476, 479 (La. Ct. App. 1941). 
 54.  See GEORGE MCKAY, A Cause of Action for an Injury to Separate Property, or for Violation 
of a Separate Right Is Separate, in A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY FOR 
DO NOT DELETE 4/20/2012  1:28 PM 
[Vol. 39: 865, 2012] California Wrongful Death Damages 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
877 
Since these new approaches were few in number and not tied to 
California law, it is not surprising that in 1922 a California intermediate 
appellate court addressed the issue of classifying a married person’s 
wrongful death recovery in the same manner in which the McFadden court 
in 1891 had dealt with damages for injury to a wife’s womb.  The case was 
Keena v. United Railroads of San Francisco55 and involved a four-year- and 
eight-month-old boy who was struck by the defendant’s cable car and died 
from his injuries.56  The decedent’s father brought a wrongful death suit 
alleging negligence by the railroad.57  The railroad pleaded, as a defense, that 
the child’s mother had been contributorily negligent by allowing the boy to 
play on the street without reasonable supervision.58  Judgment for the 
plaintiff father was reversed due to errors in jury instructions relating to 
contributory negligence.59 
In a rehearing petition, the plaintiff father urged that the mother’s 
contributory negligence was not an issue because the father alone had been 
awarded damages and they were his separate property; as a result, the wife 
could not benefit from her own wrong as she arguably would if the damages 
recovered were community property.60  The court of appeal rejected the 
assertion that a married claimant’s wrongful death damages should be 
classified as separate property: 
In this state a father may maintain an action for an injury to, or the 
death of, a minor child.  Code Civ. Proc. § 376.  The mother, having 
an interest in the subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief 
demanded, may be joined as a plaintiff.  Code Civ. Proc. § 378.  
The proceeds of a favorable judgment in such an action become 
community property.  Civ. Code §§ 163, 164, and 687.61 
In reaching this conclusion, the court did not cite any precedent but, as the 
court did in McFadden, relied on what was then California Civil Code 
 
ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, IDAHO, LOUISIANA, NEVADA, NEW MEXICO, TEXAS, AND WASHINGTON (1st 
ed. 1910).  “The cause of action takes the same character as the right violated . . . .”  Id. § 78, at 163.  
“Upon principle it would seem that the right violated should determine whether the right to recover 
is separate, or community property.”  Id. § 180, at 247.  But McKay conceded that all the reported 
cases then on point held that personal injury recoveries by a spouse could not be traced to a separate 
property source, such as a separate right.  Id. § 181, at 248. 
 55.  207 P. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922). 
    56.  Id. at 36. 
    57.  Id.  
    58.  Id.  
    59.  Id. at 37–38. 
    60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 38.  
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section 163’s definition of the husband’s separate property as limited to 
assets coming to him “by gift, bequest, devise, or descent” if the acquisition 
was during marriage.62  The wrongful death cause of action the husband 
brought in Keena did not meet this definition’s test.  In denying a hearing in 
Keena, the California Supreme Court declared: “We approve of that portion 
of the opinion [of the court of appeal] holding that the proceeds of the 
judgment in favor of the father is community property . . . .”63 
B. Subsequent California Decisions Consistent with Keena 
Keena was followed in 1935 by another terse holding that “[t]he 
proceeds of a favorable judgment in an action brought by a father [for 
wrongful death of a child] are community property . . . .”—citing only 
Keena.64  Three courts of appeal decisions in the 1960s similarly applied this 
rule without any analysis of why the money damages can be traced back to 
the cause of action for wrongful death, but the cause of action itself cannot 
be traced back to benefits the plaintiff-spouse was deprived of due to the 
death of his or her relative.65 
 
 62.  Former section 687 of the California Civil Code, relied on by the Keena court as well as 
section 163, provided in 1922: “Community property is property acquired by husband and wife, or 
either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate property of either or as common or joint 
property of both.”  Former section 687 was enacted as part of the California Civil Code of 1872. 
 63.  Keena, 207 P. at 38.  This comment by the California Supreme Court was elicited by its 
disagreement with a passage in the opinion of the court of appeal in Keena in which that court held 
that the wrongful death damages were community property and stated: “[T]he proceeds of such a 
judgment passed to the surviving husband and wife, one moiety to each.”  Id.  The common law term 
“moiety” described the equal shares of co-owners in common law joint tenancy and the interests of 
tenants in common having equal shares.  Green v. Skinner, 197 P. 60, 61 (Cal. 1921) (surviving joint 
tenant takes moiety of property held with deceased joint tenant not as successor to the latter but by 
right created by the conveyance); Thompson v. Jones, 141 P. 366, 366 (Cal. 1914) (“[B]y this deed 
the two became tenants in common of the land, each owning an undivided moiety thereof.”).  The 
term “moiety” had no application to the civil law institution of community property.  Indeed, in 1922 
when hearing was denied in Keena, the California Supreme Court was still adhering to its odd theory 
that during marriage the husband had the entire ownership of community property (even the wife’s 
earnings), the wife having merely a non-proprietary expectancy that would ripen into ownership of 
one half should she survive him.  See Spreckles v. Spreckles, 158 P. 537, 539 (Cal. 1916).  
Somehow, however, the wife’s lack of ownership did not bar imputing her negligence to her 
husband on the ground that she would benefit if he were permitted to obtain a community property 
recovery.  The statement by the court of appeal that the wife acquired a half interest in the damages 
was inconsistent with the Spreckles theory that a wife had a mere expectancy in community 
property.  Perhaps more significantly, the notion that a half interest “passed” to the husband 
himself—apparently directly and not derivatively based on his ownership interest in her 
acquisitions—undercut the theoretical basis for imputing her negligence to him when he brought 
suit.  Thus, the California Supreme Court, in denying a hearing in Keena, concluded the sentence 
that approved the community property classification of the damages (quoted in part above in text) 
with these words: “[B]ut we disapprove of that portion of the opinion to the effect that the proceeds 
of the judgment pass to the parents, one-half to each.”  Keena, 207 P. at 38. 
 64.  Abos v. Martyn, 52 P.2d 987, 987–88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935).   
 65.  Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 44, 51 n.6 (Ct. App. 1968); Premo v. Grigg, 46 
Cal. Rptr. 683, 688 (Ct. App. 1965); Cervantes v. Maco Gas Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 75, 77–78 (Ct. App. 
1960). 
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In 1947 the California Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Tucker stated, 
without any analysis, that “the proceeds of the judgment [for wrongful 
death] are community property.”66  For this proposition Fuentes cited only 
the California Supreme Court’s comment in denying hearing in Keena and 
the 1924 court of appeal decision in Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond 
Granite Co.,67 discussed below,68 which classified damages recovered by a 
married person for wrongful death of a minor child as 100% community 
property on a legal theory very different from that employed in Keena. 
Five years later in Flores v. Brown,69 the California Supreme Court 
again made a one-sentence pronouncement about classifying damages 
recovered for wrongful death as separate or community property without any 
explanation except for citations to Fuentes and Sandberg: “[I]t is settled that 
a cause of action for injuries to either the husband and the wife arising 
during marriage and while they are living together is community 
property . . . , and the same rule is applicable to a cause of action for the 
wrongful death of a minor child . . . .”70 
It is clear that no California appellate court decision has specifically 
considered why 100% of a married person’s wrongful death recovery must 
be community property and why there can be no tracing back to determine 
what kind of loss forms the basis for the plaintiff-spouse’s cause of action.  
The specific issue apparently has never been presented to an appellate court 
in California. 
IV. THE THEORY THAT A CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION COMPELLED 
THE COURTS TO CLASSIFY SOME WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERIES  
AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
A. The 1924 Sandberg Decision 
In the 1924 Sandberg case,71 the eight-year-old son of Mr. and Mrs. 
Sandberg died due to the defendant granite quarry operator’s negligence in 
maintaining an attractive nuisance.72  The boy’s father was the sole plaintiff 
 
 66.  Fuentes v. Tucker, 187 P.2d 752, 758 (Cal. 1947) (where two married couples sued for the 
wrongful death of minor sons of each of them in consolidated actions). 
 67.  226 P. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924).  See Fuentes, 187 P.2d at 758.  Sandberg is discussed in 
detail below.  See infra text accompanying notes 74–116. 
 68.  See infra text accompanying notes 71–96. 
 69.  248 P.2d 922 (Cal. 1952). 
 70.  Id. at 926 (citations omitted). 
 71.  Sandberg, 226 P. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924). 
    72.  Id. at 29. 
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in the wrongful death action, but the jury was instructed to determine the 
pecuniary loss suffered by both the plaintiff and his wife, the mother of the 
child.73  In its original opinion in the case, the California court of appeal held 
that the jury instruction was proper because the recovery would be 
community property, in which the mother had an interest, although the 
property was subject to the management of her husband.74 
The defendant filed a petition for rehearing, renewing its argument that 
the jury should have been permitted to consider only damages to the 
husband caused by the child’s death, but on a new and quite extraordinary 
theory.75  The rehearing petition conceded that the wrongful death cause of 
action was community property.76  Notwithstanding this, the defendant 
argued that Section 376, as worded at the time of the tort, made the damages 
awarded to the plaintiff father his separate property.77  Dealing with recovery 
for the wrongful death of a minor child, the defendant contended, Section 
376 was “based upon the common law, not the civil law.”78  Since the statute 
addressed “the common law remedies of a parent, . . . the legislature could 
not in reason be supposed to have had the question of community property in 
mind.”79  Thus, the father’s recovery in Sandberg was said to be English 
common law separate property even though the cause of action was 
community property. 
Not surprisingly, the court of appeal rejected this contention.  In its 
opinion denying the petition for rehearing, the court quoted the following 
language of then Section 376 of the California Code of Civil Procedure:80 
A father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the 
mother, may maintain an action for the injury or death of a minor 
child, and a guardian for the injury or death of his ward, when such 
injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another.81 
 
    73.  Id. at 32. 
 74.  Id. (citing Keena v. United R.Rs. of S.F., 207 P. 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922)).  See supra text 
accompanying notes 61–64. 
    75.  Sandberg, 226 P. at 32–33. 
 76.  “It is quite true that the father’s right of action for damages is community property (C.C. 
164).  So is the right of action of the mother (same section).”  Appellants’ Petition for a Rehearing at 
13, Sandberg v. McGilvray-Raymond Granite Co., 226 P. 28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924) (No. 2707).  At 
this time Section 164 of the California Civil Code defined community property.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 
164 (1872) (current versions at CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 700, 760, 803 (2004)). 
    77.  Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing, supra note 76, at 13.  
 78.  Id.  Apparently, the defendant forgot that “the right of action for wrongful death, not having 
existed in the common law, is unqualifiedly statutory.”  Bayer v. Suttle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (Ct. 
App. 1972) (internal quotations omitted). 
 79.  Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing, supra note 76, at 13–14. 
    80.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 376 (West 1872). 
 81.  Sandberg, 226 P. at 33 (internal quotations omitted).   
DO NOT DELETE 4/20/2012  1:28 PM 
[Vol. 39: 865, 2012] California Wrongful Death Damages 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
881 
The intermediate appellate court conceded that it would be reasonable to 
hold that words of Section 376 “in so far as they relate to parties plaintiff, 
were intended to affect the procedure merely”82 and would not implicitly 
classify the damages recovered as community property—a substantive rather 
than a procedural matter.  The court might have added that the Civil Code 
contained the statutes dealing with the classification of marital acquisitions 
as community or separate property,83 and that one would not have expected 
the legislature to have inserted into the Code of Civil Procedure substantive 
rules defining community property.  Nevertheless, the court held: 
An examination of the provisions of section 376, viewed in the light 
of the history of the legislation upon the subject-matter embraced 
therein, discloses a legislative intent to give the marital community 
a right of action for the death by wrongful act of a minor child.  
What is recovered in such a case is community property and 
therefore the husband, who has control of the community property,84 
is authorized to maintain the action.  If the community is destroyed 
by the death or desertion of the husband, then the wife may sue. . . . 
[S]ection 376, in so far as it authorizes the husband to maintain an 
action for the death of a minor child, is framed upon the theory of 
the continuance of the marital community and that the husband is 
the representative thereof for the purpose of maintaining the action.  
There was no necessity of joining the wife as a party plaintiff.85 
 
 82.  Id.  As stated in House v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 95 P.2d 465, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939), 
overruled on another ground by Fuentes v. Tucker, 187 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1947): “The purpose of 
section 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure was to designate the necessary party plaintiff in order 
that a defendant might be protected against multiplicity of actions and that a finality of the litigation 
might be assured.”  These are solely procedural purposes for this statute. 
 83.  In 1924 several Civil Code sections could have been cited, including former sections 162, 
163, 164, 169, and 687. 
 84.  In California, wives had no management of any community property until 1951 with the 
enactment of former Civil Code section 171c (enacted by 1951 Cal. Stat. 2860 and repealed in 
1983), which gave wives control over their own uncommingled earnings.  See William A. Reppy, 
Jr., Retroactivity of the 1975 California Community Property Reforms, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 977, 1053 
(1975).  By statutes enacted in 1891, 1901, and 1917, the wife did, however, have veto power over 
the husband’s attempts to make gifts of community property, to encumber or sell community 
household furnishings, and to convey or encumber community realty.  Id.  
 85.  Sandberg, 226 P. at 33. 
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B.   Sandberg Was Erroneously Decided 
1.  Section 376 of the California Code of Civil Procedure Dealt 
Only with Procedural Matters 
The notion that, under Section 376, when a child of the marriage was 
tortiously killed, the father/husband alone was the proper plaintiff meant that 
recovery would be community property, subject at the time to his exclusive 
management, may have had some initial appeal; but a closer examination 
indicates that the theory that the statute includes a directive to classify the 
recovery as community property is unsound.  Suppose the child was killed 
after the child’s parents were divorced based on the wife’s adultery.86  The 
father had never deserted the mother, and his child (the “family” under 
Section 376) and was not dead, so Section 376 made him alone the proper 
plaintiff.87  Yet, because he was not married to the mother at the time the 
wrongful death cause of action arose, the recovery could not by any logic be 
community property, as without a marriage there is no community. 
Moreover, if the legislature’s designation of the father as the proper 
plaintiff in certain circumstances evinced an intent to have courts classify the 
damages recovered in a wrongful death suit as community property, then the 
statute’s making the mother the proper plaintiff in all other circumstances 
must likewise implicitly carry with it an intent regarding classification of the 
damages she might recover.  It seems clear from the Sandberg court’s 
comment that the wife is entitled to be the plaintiff only after the community 
has been “destroyed” that Sandberg had concluded the legislative intent in 
enacting Section 376 was to classify the recovery as the wife’s separate 
property when she was the plaintiff.88  In a situation where the husband 
deserted his wife and child and days later the child was tortiously killed, 
there would seem to be serious doubts about the constitutionality of equating 
the father’s desertion of the family to the severing of the husband-father’s 
parental relationship to the child without any hearing to examine the reason 
for such desertion.89  Sandberg implies that, because the mother is made the 
 
 86.  In 1939, Section 376 was amended to delete reference to the father’s desertion of his wife 
and to provide instead that the action for wrongful death of a minor child should be brought by the 
“father of a minor, or if the father is dead or the parents of said minor are living separate or apart 
and the mother of the minor then has care or custody of said minor, then the mother . . . .”  1939 Cal. 
Stat. 1759 (emphasis added).  Wexler v. City of Los Angeles, 243 P.2d 868, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952), 
assumed that the reference to parents “living separate or apart” included parents who had been 
divorced before the death of the minor child.  Notwithstanding Wexler’s creative holding, it seems 
impossible that the pre-1939 language of Section 376 referring to desertion of the husband could 
have been construed to include the situation where the parents were divorced at the time of the tort 
although the husband had never deserted the wife.   
    87.  See CIV. § 376. 
    88.  Sandberg, 226 P. at 33. 
 89.  See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
These cases establish that even a biological father who was never married to the mother has a 
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plaintiff, any recovery is her separate property, and the father has suffered 
no loss from the death of his child—a forfeiture similar to a decree cutting 
off his paternal rights.  Courts decline to give an interpretation to a statute 
that renders it unconstitutional or even raises grave doubts concerning its 
constitutionality, when the wording thereof does not demand such an 
interpretation.90  Certainly Section 376 as worded in 1924 was susceptible to 
the interpretation that it dealt solely with procedural issues and did not 
extend to substantive definitions of community and separate property.91 
2.  Sandberg Misunderstood the Living-Apart Doctrine 
The Sandberg court was also just wrong in stating that desertion by the 
husband destroyed the community.92  Even assuming the desertion referred 
to in Section 376 as worded in 1924 was a desertion the husband intended to 
be a permanent, “complete and final break in the marital relationship”93 so 
 
relationship interest with their non-marital child with whom he has established a parental 
relationship, see Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), that is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the federal Constitution, at least where no other male has a claim as father.  See 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 90.  See People v. Superior Court, 917 P.2d 628, 633 (Cal. 1996) (quoting Miller v. Mun. Court, 
142 P.2d 297, 303 (Cal. 1943)): 
“If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional 
and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful 
constitutional questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing 
violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its 
entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction 
is equally reasonable.”   
Accord Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000) (“‘[W]here a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of 
which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.’”  The Court in Jones was quoting 
United States ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).). 
    91.  See discussion supra pp. 881–82.  
    92.  Sandberg, 226 P. at 33. 
 93.  Baragry v. Baragry (In re Marriage of Baragry), 140 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (Ct. App. 1977) 
(construing “living separate and apart” in former section 5118 of the California Civil Code, the 
successor to Civil Code section 169, the living-apart statute enacted in 1872 and in effect in 1924 
when Sandberg was decided).  Today the living-apart statute, Family Code section 771, is gender 
neutral so that the husband’s earnings—not just those of the wife as under the statute in effect in 
1924—during such a period of separation are separate property.  Bouquet v. Bouquet (In re Marriage 
of Bouquet), 546 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Cal. 1976), held that the version of the statute in effect in 1924 
that benefitted only the wife was “patently unfair” due to gender discrimination and permitted 
application of the gender-neutral version of the statute in effect at the time of divorce in Bouquet to 
the husband’s acquisitions while living separate and apart from the wife and prior to enactment of 
the gender-neutral text, resulting in the wife being stripped of her community interest in such 
earnings, an outcome that the Bouquet court considered to involve retroactive application of the 
gender-neutral statute.  Note also that, at the time of the death of their child due to a tortfeasor’s 
negligence, the parents, husband and wife, could be living separate and apart, each believing their 
DO NOT DELETE 4/20/2012  1:28 PM 
 
884 
that a court would hold that the couple were “living separate” under the text 
of former California Civil Code section 169, then in effect,94 the legal result 
would have been that the wife’s earnings and accumulations were her 
separate property, while those of the husband acquired while living separate 
and apart from her were community property95 in which the wife had an 
interest, precluding any conclusion that the community had been 
“destroyed” or otherwise had ceased to exist.96 
C. A 1950 Decision Implicitly Rejects Sandberg 
Christiana v. Rose,97 a 1950 decision by the California court of appeal, 
is inconsistent with Sandberg’s suggestion that, if Section 376 names the 
mother as the appropriate plaintiff for a suit arising from the wrongful death 
of a minor child, all recovery must be her separate property and there can be 
no community property recovery based on damages suffered by the 
father/husband.  The cause of action in Christiana arose after a 1939 
amendment to Section 376 deleted reference to desertion of the family by 
the father and provided instead that the mother was the proper plaintiff when 
 
marriage was completely a dead letter, not due to desertion of the husband but rather by agreement 
of the spouses, perhaps an agreement following the wife’s initial suggestion that they should 
permanently separate (perhaps for religious reasons they also agreed not to divorce).  Under the 
passage from Sandberg quoted in text, there being no desertion by, or death of, the father, he would 
be the proper plaintiff to sue, and all the recovery would be community property, depriving the wife 
of her claim under section 169 of the California Civil Code, as worded in 1924, that damages she 
suffered should be her separate property.  Since Sandberg looked to section 376 of the California 
Code of Civil Procedure for legislative direction concerning classification of a wrongful death 
recovery, the wife’s invoking of section 169 of the Civil Code would have had to have been rejected.  
Id.  See also Espinosa v. Haslam, 47 P.2d 479, 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935), where the husband and 
wife separated and the husband provided a home for his son, who decided at age eighteen to leave 
his father and move in with his mother, with whom he was living when at age twenty he was 
tortiously killed (having the status of a minor child under California law at this time).  The court held 
that the father was entitled to sue for wrongful death under Section 376 because he had provided a 
home and support for the son, and thus there had been no “desertion of his family” (the Section 376 
language) by the father.  Under Sandberg, all the recovery would be community property even 
though the wife was living separate and apart from the husband and would be invoking (without 
success) Civil Code section 169. 
 94.  As enacted in 1872, section 169 of the California Civil Code in 1922 provided: “The 
earnings and accumulations of the wife, and of her minor children living with her or in her custody, 
while she is living separate from her husband, are the separate property of the wife.”  Current 
version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 771 (West 2004). 
 95.  See Randolph v. Randolph, 258 P.2d 547, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); see also Brown v. 
Brown, 147 P. 1168, 1169–70 (Cal. 1915) (husband’s earnings during pendency of divorce action 
were community property). 
 96.  See supra text accompanying note 85.  Even under the present gender-neutral living apart 
statute, section 771 of the California Family Code, the community is not “destroyed” even though 
earnings and accumulations of each spouse after the separation are the separate property of each 
acquiring party.  Pre-separation community capital remains community property and will produce 
community-owned dividends, interest, and rentals.  Such acquisitions are not the “accumulations” of 
either the separated husband or the separated wife but rather are the fruits of the community capital. 
 97.  222 P.2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). 
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“the parents of said [deceased] minor are living separate or apart and the 
mother of the minor then has care or custody of said minor,”98 as was the 
fact pattern in Christiana.99  While an action to dissolve her marriage was 
pending, the wife sued the tortfeasor for wrongful death of the child of the 
marriage, proved only her own damages, and obtained a judgment upon 
which she collected.100  After the divorce became final—it made no division 
of any community property—the father sued the ex-wife for half of the 
damages she had collected on the ground they were community property not 
distributed at their divorce, so that he owned half as a tenant in common.101 
The court held102 that Section 376 gave the wife standing to sue as 
heir103 and that former California Civil Code section 169, the living-apart 
statute, made her recovery separate property,104 and it stressed that her proof 
of damages at trial dealt solely with loss to her and not with loss suffered by 
the father.105  Nevertheless, the court said that the father “could, and perhaps 
 
 98.  1939 Cal. Stat. 1759. 
   99.  Christiana, 222 P.2d at 892. 
  100.  Id. at 892–93. 
  101.  Id. at 893. 
 102.  The court declared that its theory that the wife’s recovery was her separate property was 
actually an “alternative” holding and that it was also affirming the judgment that the father take 
nothing in his action against the ex-wife on the trial court’s reasoning that her recovery had been 
community property and that the father was estopped by his actions during the prior divorce trial 
from claiming a former community interest.  Id. at 892–96.  Obviously, the recovery cannot be both 
separate property and community property, so one of the so-called alternative holdings has to be 
legally wrong.  Christiana has been subsequently cited for the holding that the wife’s recovery was 
separate property as an “accumulation[]” under the living-apart statute, now codified at section 771 
of the California Family Code.  Wall v. Wall (In re Marriage of Wall), 105 Cal. Rptr. 201, 203 
(1972).  Courts should ignore the portion of Christiana that assumed a separated wife’s recovery in 
the 1940s for wrongful death of a child of hers and her husband’s could be community property due 
to Section 376. 
 103.  Christiana, 222 P.2d at 895. 
 104.  Id. at 897. 
 105.  Id. at 896.  The mother ought to have been able to prove that the deceased child had 
regularly given substantial gifts each year jointly to her and her husband—his father.  A gift to a 
cohabiting husband and wife in equal shares is probably community property under California law.  
See Gonzales v. Gonzales (In re Marriage of Gonzales), 172 Cal. Rptr. 179, 182–84 (Ct. App. 1981); 
see also Fuller v. Ferguson, 26 Cal. 546, 565–66 (1864) (stating, in a discussion of Mexican law in 
effect in California before it was acquired by the United States that a lucrative acquisition by 
husband and wife jointly during marriage is community property); Scott v. Ward, 13 Cal. 458, 469 
(1859) (also discussing Spanish and Mexican law in effect, which required that “property acquired 
by the husband and wife during the marriage, and whilst living together, whether by onerous or 
lucrative title . . . belong[s] to the community”).  The influential Washington case so holding, In re 
Estate of Salvini, 397 P.2d 811, 814 (Wash. 1964), should be persuasive.  But see Andrews v. 
Andrews, 186 P.2d 744, 748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (finding that a gift during marriage by the 
husband’s aunt to the husband and wife was held in tenancy in common.  But the issue litigated was 
not whether it was community property as opposed to tenancy in common property owned in equal 
shares, but whether both spouses were the donee or just the husband alone).  If the trier of fact in 
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should, have been joined as a plaintiff or defendant in the wrongful death 
action.”106  Under section 169 as then worded, had he been made a party and 
proved his own loss arising out of the death of his child, the father’s 
recovery would have been community property.  This is inconsistent with 
the apparent teaching of Sandberg that, in a fact situation where Section 376 
declares the mother as a proper plaintiff, that designation carries with it the 
rule that all recovery is her separate property.107 
D.   Statutory Changes Abrogated the Sandberg Holding 
Sandberg was an erroneous decision.  Although it was twice cited by the 
California Supreme Court without explanation as to why,108 it seems likely 
that the supreme court was approving merely the result—that the damages 
recovered there by the father-husband for wrongful death of a minor child, 
occurring when the spouses were not living separate and apart were 
community property—and that the supreme court did not intend to approve 
Sandberg’s reasoning that Section 376 as worded in 1924 contained 
provisions classifying wrongful death recoveries by married persons as 
community or separate property.109  Surely approval of no more than the 
result in Sandberg was the basis for the California Supreme Court’s first 
citation of that case in Fuentes v. Tucker110 because that citation was coupled 
with one to Keena, where the reasoning behind the community property 
classification—resting on the Civil Code sections defining community and 
separate property, and not on Code of Civil Procedure Section 376111—was 
inconsistent with the Sandberg opinion.112 
In any event, Sandberg surely was legislatively abrogated in 1949, when 
Section 376 was amended to address only suits based on injury to a minor 
 
Christiana were to find by inference that the decedent, had he not been killed, would have continued 
making such gifts even after his parents separated, half the amount of such future gifts that could not 
be made due to the tortiously-caused death of the donor child would be the separate property of the 
plaintiff-mother due to applicability of the living-apart statute (which then benefitted only wives) 
and would be part of her wrongful death damages.  Although she would have had standing to prove 
the loss of the total gifts that could not be made in order to have her half factored into her damages, 
she would not have had standing to collect in her wrongful death suit the community one-half of the 
gift that would have been made post-separation to her husband, as he was the sole manager of the 
community at the time and the proper plaintiff to recover such a loss. 
 106.  Christiana, 222 P.2d at 896.  It was subsequently established that in this fact situation, the 
plaintiff-mother’s failure to join the father as a party to the wrongful death suit gave the father a 
cause of action for damages against the mother.  See Hall v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 806, 
812 (Ct. App. 2003) (following Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 78 (Ct. App. 1997)).   
  107.  See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 108.  See supra text accompanying notes 67, 69–70. 
  109.  See supra text accompanying notes 66–70. 
 110.  See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 111.  See supra text accompanying note 63. 
  112.  See supra text accompanying note 66. 
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child, not death of the child, and former California Code of Civil Procedure 
section 377 was amended to provide, in the pertinent part: 
When the death of a . . . minor person who leaves surviving him 
either a . . . father or mother . . . is caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of another, his heirs . . . may maintain an action for damages 
against the person causing the death . . . .  The respective rights of 
the heirs in any award shall be determined by the court.113 
Today, no section of the California Code of Civil Procedure deals 
specifically with the wrongful death of a minor child.  Section 377.60, 
entitled “Persons with standing,” says that when a relative has been 
tortiously killed, an action for wrongful death “may be asserted” by the 
decedent’s intestate heirs if the decedent leaves no issue.114  Section 377.61 
is, today, similar to the final sentence quoted from the 1949 revision: “The 
court shall determine the respective rights in an award of the persons entitled 
to assert the cause of action.”115  If the plaintiff is a married person and the 
issue arises as to whether the recovery is community or separate property or 
both, this statute should be viewed as referring the court to the Family Code 
provisions defining separate and community property116 and to judicial 
decisions dealing with principles of tracing marital property through changes 
in form or to a source associated with the occurrence of a loss. 
V.  JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE DEPARTURE FROM THE MCFADDEN RULE 
THAT ALL COMPONENTS OF A PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERY BY A 
NON-SEPARATED MARRIED PERSON MUST BE COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
A. The Nevada Supreme Court Rejects McFadden’s Limitation on Tracing 
The first judicial departure from the rule of California’s McFadden 
decision that a damages award based on personal injuries to a married 
person could be traced to the cause of action on which it was based, but not 
further back as, for example, to the body of the spouse that was damaged, 
came from the Nevada Supreme Court in 1940.  In Fredrickson & Watson 
Construction Co. v. Boyd,117 the trial court had refused to instruct the jury in 
a wife’s personal injury case that her husband’s contributory negligence 
 
 113.  1949 Cal. Stat. 2401–02. 
  114.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2004). 
  115.  Id. § 377.61. 
 116.  See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 760, 770 (West 2004). 
 117.  102 P.2d 627 (Nev. 1940). 
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could be imputed to her, and the Nevada Supreme Court said it should have 
been so instructed if her recovery was community property.118 
But the Nevada Supreme Court held that trial court did not err because 
the damages to be recovered by the wife would be her separate property.119  
“[T]he judgment takes its character from the right violated, namely, the right 
of personal security.”120  The court stressed that this “said right, the wife 
brings to the marriage.”121 
B. California Courts Consider the Nevada Approach to Classification of 
Personal Injury Damages Recovered by a Married Person 
In 1947, one dissenting justice on the California Supreme Court adopted 
the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding in Fredrickson, as applied to damages 
awarded a married person for pain, suffering, and disfigurement.122  This 
 
 118.  Id. at 628. 
  119.  Id. 
  120.  Id. at 629. 
 121.  Id.  The court also quoted from GEORGE MCKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY ¶ 398, at 296 (2d ed. 1925), which had asserted that the husband does not “‘hold the 
wife’s right to personal security and should not be permitted to recover for the violation of this right.  
It does not belong to him nor to the community.  The wife’s physical pain and suffering are not his 
loss nor the loss of the community.’”  Fredrickson, 102 P.2d at 629 (emphasis added); see also supra 
note 54.  The Nevada Supreme Court’s use of this quotation suggests that the damages to the wife in 
Fredrickson consisted only of compensation for pain and suffering and did not extend to lost 
earnings or even reimbursement for medical bills incurred, as the community would have a claim to 
those components under McKay’s analysis.  Nevertheless the Nevada Supreme Court declared 
without express qualification that “the judgment and proceeds flowing therefrom” were the wife’s 
separate property.  Fredrickson, 102 P.2d at 629.  In Choate v. Ransom, 323 P.2d 700, 702 (Nev. 
1958) (emphasis added), the court said Fredrickson “held that a recovery by a married person for 
personal injuries is the separate property of that person.”  The Nevada Supreme Court has never 
considered whether it would follow the lead of subsequent decisions in other states—cited in the 
next paragraph of this footnote—that classify the lost earnings and medical bill components of the 
recovery as community property.  In 1975 the Nevada legislature amended section 123.130 of the 
Nevada Revised Statutes to provide in subdivision (1) that “[a]ll property of the wife owned by her 
before marriage, and that acquired by her afterwards . . . by an award for personal injury 
damages . . . is her separate property.”  Subdivision (2) of this statute makes the same provision for 
Nevada husbands.  Query if the Nevada Supreme Court will view this statute as barring it from 
holding that so much of the recovery as is based on lost earnings during marriage and on medical 
bills incurred during marriage should be classified as community property.  Recall that Louisiana 
appellate courts did not feel so restricted by a similar statute enacted in that state.  See supra notes 
51–53 and accompanying text.   
  Other states followed Nevada in holding that a spouse’s pain and suffering damages should 
be judicially classified as the victim’s separate property.  See Brown v. Brown (In re Marriage of 
Brown), 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984); Jurek v. Jurek, 606 P.2d 812 (Ariz. 1980); Rogers v. 
Yellowstone Park Co., 539 P.2d 566 (Idaho 1974); Soto v. Vandeventer, 245 P.2d 826 (N.M. 1952). 
 122.  Zaragosa v. Craven, 202 P.2d 73, 78 (Cal. 1947) (Carter, J., dissenting); see also Kesler v. 
Pabst, 273 P.2d 257, 260–63 (Cal. 1954) (Carter, J., dissenting). 
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justice would have overruled the dictate of McFadden that the majority in 
the 1947 case fully approved.123 
1.   Death of the Non-Victim Spouse Held to Make McFadden 
Inapplicable 
Five years later, however, in Flores v. Brown,124 the California Supreme 
Court, without dissent on this point, seemed to concede the illogic of the 
McFadden mandate for classifying not only all the components of a spouse’s 
personal injury recovery as community property, but also his or her recovery 
for the wrongful death of a minor child.  In a single accident, the 
contributorily negligent husband and a minor child of the marriage were 
killed and the wife was badly injured.125  The wife sued the driver of the 
other vehicle, asserting, inter alia, causes of action for her own personal 
injuries and for the wrongful death of her minor son.126  Because the 
husband’s death in the accident had dissolved the marriage and the 
community, the California Supreme Court held, “[T]he interests in any of 
these causes of action become separate property, and it becomes possible to 
segregate the elements of damages that would, except for the community 
property system, be considered personal to each spouse.”127  Surely the court 
had in mind at least pain and suffering damages in referring to an 
“element[]” of the wife’s recovery that is as a matter of logic “personal” to 
her.  The “community property system” in California was not based on a 
universal community, rather, it recognized the existence of separate property 
during the marriage, and it had been settled that separately owned assets 
brought to the marriage could produce mutations that were likewise separate 
based on principles of tracing.128  Thus, Flores made no sense in asserting 
that the existence of such a “system” made it impossible to “segregate” the 
pain-and-suffering component of a spouse’s personal injury recovery in 
order to classify it as the victim’s separate property except due to 
 
 123.  Zaragosa, 202 P.2d at 76–77 (“[T]he cause of action for personal injuries suffered by either 
spouse . . . as well as any recovery therefore, constitutes community property.” (citing CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 162–164, 687 (current versions at CAL. FAM. CODE § 780 (West 1992)))). 
 124.  248 P.2d 922 (Cal. 1952).  For a fuller discussion of Flores, see William A. Reppy, Jr., The 
Effect of the Adoption of Comparative Negligence on California Community Property Law: Has 
Imputed Negligence Been Revived?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1366–68 (1977). 
  125.  Flores, 248 P.2d at 923. 
  126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 926 (emphasis added). 
  128.  See, e.g., Dimmick v. Dimmick, 30 P. 547, 548 (Cal. 1892) (property brought into a 
marriage may maintain its status as separate property if it can be clearly traced, even if it undergoes 
mutations); see also supra text accompanying notes 46–48. 
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recognition that precedents like McFadden were to be found in the reports of 
decisions which the court was unwilling to overrule. 
With respect to the damages that can be awarded to a spouse or to 
spouses for the wrongful death of a minor child, the Flores court stated: 
“Damages for wrongful death are the sum of those suffered by each heir or 
parent.”129  This seemed to recognize that the damages each parent suffers 
when both seek an award of damages will not be the same in amount, and 
thus each claim is based on a personal loss.130  If so, the award should not be 
community property, which treats each spouse as co-equal owners of a half 
interest in each asset so classified.131 
2.   Post-Injury Divorce Renders McFadden Inapplicable 
Four years later, the California Supreme Court’s opinion in Washington 
v. Washington132 confirmed that Flores should be read as expressing 
disenchantment with the McFadden approach to classification.  In 
Washington a husband was tortiously injured during marriage but did not 
obtain a judgment for damages until after divorce.  The issue was whether 
the damages were traceable to a community property cause of action, 
making  the ex-wife co-owner of the damages.133  The court rejected this 
view and said: 
A rule permitting apportionment of the damages . . . has never been 
adopted in this state, and in the absence thereof, treating the entire 
cause of action as community property protects the community 
interests in the elements that clearly should belong to it. . . .[134]  
Although such a rule may be justified when it appears that the 
marriage will continue, it loses its force when the marriage is 
dissolved after the cause of action accrues.  In such a case not only 
may the personal elements of damage such as past pain and 
suffering be reasonably treated as belonging to the injured party, but 
the damages for future pain and suffering, future expenses, and 
 
 129.  Flores, 248 P.2d at 927 (emphasis added).  For purposes of calculating damages for 
wrongful death, the quoted passage treats the mother and father of the decedent the same as a son 
and a daughter of the decedent who might, as “heir[s]” of the decedent, be the plaintiffs in the 
wrongful death suit.  See id.  It could not be contended that the awards to such a son and daughter 
would have to be equal in amount. 
  130.  See id. 
 131.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (West 1994) (interests of husband and wife in community 
property are “equal interests”; CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101(a) (West 2002) (each spouse owns an 
“undivided one-half interest in the community” property)); People v. Lockett, 102 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44 
(Ct. App. 1972) (wife owns “one half of her husband[’s] . . . earnings”). 
 132.  302 P.2d 569 (Cal. 1956). 
  133.  Id. at 569–70. 
 134.  I suggest the “elements” that the court has in mind here are lost earnings during marriage 
and cohabitation and reimbursement for medical bills incurred during marriage and cohabitation. 
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future loss of earnings are clearly attributable to him as a single 
person following the divorce.135 
The ex-wife in Washington had sued the tort victim, her former husband, 
seeking a division of the personal injury damages he had recovered after 
their divorce.136  Based on the above-quoted passage, she should have had a 
sound claim to half of the damages recovered by the ex-husband for lost 
earnings during marriage and to half of his recovery based on medical bills 
incurred during marriage.  But the Washington court gave her nothing.137  It 
held: “Since we have no rule permitting the apportionment of the elements 
of a cause of action for personal injuries between the spouses’ separate and 
community interests and since such a cause of action is not assignable, it 
must vest in the injured party on the dissolution of the marriage.”138 
 
 135.  Id. at 571 (emphasis added).  The holding that divorce converts a personal injury cause of 
action arising out of a tort occurring when the spouses were cohabiting from community property to 
the separate property of the victim-spouse is no longer good law.  Section 2603 of the California 
Family Code currently provides that damages for personal injuries “to be received” after divorce are 
community property if the cause of action arose during marriage and before a permanent separation 
of the spouses; but, the damages are a special type of community property not subject to the 50-50 
division rule at divorce which, instead, may be awarded entirely to the victim-spouse by the divorce 
court according to guidelines laid out in the statute.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603 (West 1994); see also 
infra note 148.   
  The supreme court in the above-quoted text has said that the Washington rule that the 
personal injury cause of action is converted from community property to the victim-spouse’s 
separate property applies when the marriage is “dissolved” after the injury is suffered but before a 
judgment awarding damages has been entered.  Washington, 302 P.2d at 571.  The death of the non-
victim-spouse would “dissolve” the marriage just as would a divorce decree.  The dictum that such a 
death converts the cause of action to the surviving victim-spouse’s separate property may or may not 
have been abrogated by the subsequent enactment of section 780 of the California Family Code 
(quoted infra at note 147), which classifies the cause of action as community property if it arose 
during marriage and while the spouses were cohabiting.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 780 (West 1994).  
Section 780 contains no qualifying language indicating that the legislature thought about how long 
the community classification it mandated should endure and whether courts would have the power to 
terminate the community classification that section 780 initially attaches to the cause of action based 
on subsequent events, such as death of the non-victim-spouse.  Id. 
  136.  Washington, 302 P.2d at 569. 
 137.  Id.  This was not based on the theory that she waived the claim by not asking the divorce 
court to award her a community interest in the husband’s post-divorce recovery.  Id. at 571.  The 
Washington court indicated that the wife ought to have asked for an alimony award at divorce to 
make up for her being cut out of the tort award to the husband as his separate property for his lost 
earnings during marriage.  Id. 
 138.  Id.  Query if the court would have been willing to classify the cause of action as 100% the 
separate property of the victim-husband if analysis of the basis for his tort claim recovery made it 
clear that only five percent of the total damages awarded were for pain and suffering and the great 
bulk of the award was based on evidence of a major loss of earnings prior to divorce and extensive 
medical bills paid before the divorce.  Washington arose at a time that the living-separate-and-apart 
statute did not apply to husbands.  See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.  
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It is important to recall that the strange judicially-imposed legal barrier 
to apportionment does not apply when the recovery is not for personal 
injuries but for wrongful death of a relative.  By statute, “[a] cause of 
action”139 can be asserted in one lawsuit by multiple relatives, such as by the 
decedent’s spouse along with multiple children of the decedent.140  Although 
all the heirs must assert their claims in a single lawsuit, those claims are not 
equal in value.141  California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.61142 
directs the wrongful death court to apportion the damages into appropriate 
shares for each co-plaintiff, a rule that would apply when the plaintiffs were 
husband and wife, the parents of the decedent. 
C. McFadden Is Legislatively Abrogated 
A year after Washington, the California legislature enacted former Civil 
Code section 163.5, which provided: “All damages, special and general, 
awarded a married person in a civil action for personal injuries, are the 
separate property of such married person.”143  From 1960 to 1968, the 
California courts of appeal three times construed “personal injuries” in this 
statute as not extending to damages sought by a married parent for wrongful 
death of a child.144  The second of these decisions stated that in section 163.5 
 
 139.  This term is used in section 377.60 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, but the 
concept is more technical than that suggests.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2005).  For 
some purposes, such as calculating the statute of limitations separately for each heir entitled to sue, 
the cases view each heir as having a distinct cause of action.  See Cross v. Pac. Gas & Electric Co., 
388 P.2d 353, 354 (Cal. 1964) (viewing each heir as having a distinct cause of action).  But the heirs 
must sue together, and the damage awarded by the jury must be in a lump sum even though multiple 
heirs each make proof of losses pertaining only to the heir submitting such evidence.  E.g., San 
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 726 (Ct. App. 2007). 
 140.  CIV. PROC. § 377.60(a). 
 141.  See, e.g., Corder v. Corder, 161 P.3d 172 (Cal. 2007) (affirming division of wrongful death 
settlement under  section 377.61 of the California Code of Civil Procedure that accorded ten percent 
to decedent’s wife and ninety percent to decedent’s daughter); Cate v. Fresno Traction Co., 2 P.2d 
364 (Cal. 1931) ($1 to decedent’s estranged husband, $5000 to each of her four children—
apportioned under former section 377 of the California Code of Civil Procedure); Bartolozzi v. 
Mallegni (In re Riccomi’s Estate), 197 P. 97 (Cal. 1921) (15/16 to wife, 1/16 to mother, although 
both were heirs to half of decedent’s intestate estate—divided under former section 377). 
 142.  Section 377.61 provides: 
 In an action under this article [concerning wrongful death suits], damages may be 
awarded that, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just, but may not include 
damages recoverable under Section 377.34 [governing damages the decedent suffered 
before dying].  The court shall determine the respective rights in an award of the persons 
entitled to assert the cause of action. 
 
 143.  1957 Cal. Stat. 4066 (emphasis added). 
 144.  Casas v. Maulhardt Buick, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 44, 51 n.6 (Ct. App. 1968); Premo v. Grigg, 46 
Cal. Rptr. 683, 688 (Ct. App. 1965); Cervantes v. Maco Gas Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 75, 78 (Ct. App. 
1960).  In each case, alleged contributory negligence of one of the parents of the decedent was an 
issue, and each court held the defense could be asserted because the damages recovered by the non-
negligent spouse/parent would be community property. 
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“[t]he Legislature did not mention damage suffered by the spouses as parents 
from the wrongful death of a child.”145 
D. The Legislature Revives McFadden for Specific Fact Situations 
Section 163.5 was repealed in 1969,146 superseded by former Civil Code 
section 4800, applicable only at divorce, which provided in the pertinent 
part: 
Community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to 
the party who suffered the injuries unless the court . . . determines 
that the interests of justice require another disposition . . . .  As used 
in this section, “community property personal injury damages” 
means all money or other property received by a married person as 
community property[147] in satisfaction of a judgment for damages 
 
 145.  Premo, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 688. 
 146.  1969 Cal. Stat. 3313. 
 147.  “[R]eceived . . . as community property” indicates the legislature thought that with its repeal 
of section 163.5 the California courts would revert to McFadden and resume classifying all elements 
of personal injury damages—where the injury occurred during marriage and before a final 
separation—as community property.  However, the language in the statute did not compel such a 
result, and the courts could have adopted the nation-wide majority rule that, while damages for lost 
earnings during marriage and medical bills arising during marriage were community property, pain 
and suffering damages were the victim-spouse’s separate property.  That approach recognizes some 
personal injury damages that are community property and would not have rendered the new section 
4800 inoperable.  The present statute concerning division at divorce of personal injury damages, 
Family Code section 2603, does not defer to the courts to classify the components of a recovery but 
defines the property that is to be divided in the same manner as under former section 4800 as 
all money or other property received or to be received by a person in satisfaction of a 
judgment for damages for the person’s personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for 
the settlement or compromise of a claim for the damages, if the cause of action for the 
damages arose during the marriage . . . [and before separation]. 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2603 (West 2006).  “All money” would have to include the pain and suffering 
component of an award of damages.  Thus, as of 1994, a statute precludes the California Supreme 
Court from overruling McFadden and its ilk by providing that the pain and suffering component of a 
recovery of damages for personal injuries is the victim-spouse’s separate property.  See 1992 Cal. 
Stat. 490.  In Part 2 of Division 4 of the Family Code, entitled “Characterization of Marital 
Property,” section 780 of the California Family Code provides: 
Except as provided in Section 781 [dealing with injuries suffered by a spouse living 
separate and apart from the other spouse] and subject to the rules of allocation set forth in 
Section 2603, money and other property received or to be received by a married person in 
satisfaction of a judgment for damages for personal injuries, or pursuant to an agreement 
for the settlement or compromise of a claim for such damages, is community property if 
the cause of action for the damages arose during the marriage. 
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for his or her personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the 
settlement or compromise of a claim for such damages . . . .148 
The term “personal injury damages” in the 1969 statute is almost identical to 
“damages . . . for personal injuries” in section 163.5, which had been 
repeatedly construed to exclude damages for wrongful death recovered by a 
married person.149  This made the following rule applicable: 
“‘[w]here . . . legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent 
statute on the same or an analogous subject uses identical or substantially 
similar language, [courts] presume that the Legislature intended the same 
construction, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.’”150  That is, the new 
1969 statute did not deal at all with wrongful death damages. 
With slight linguistic modification,151 the 1969 law remains in effect 
today as Family Code section 2603152 and still applies only at divorce.  
Section 2603 compels the divorce courts to refer to personal injury damages 
as community property.  However, due to a presumption in section 2603 that 
the victim-spouse be awarded such assets, the courts do not treat such funds 
as true community property which must be divided 50-50 between wife and 
 
 148.  1969 Cal. Stat. 3333.  This part of former section 4800 of the California Civil Code was 
renumbered as subsection (c) of the statute in 1970.  1970 Cal. Stat. 1726. 
 149.  “Community property personal injury damages” was converted into “community estate 
personal injury damages” when section 2603 of the California Family Code became effective in 
1994.  1992 Cal. Stat. 533.  As used in statutes in the Family Code, “Community estate includes both 
community property and quasi-community property.”  CAL. FAM. CODE § 63 (internal quotations 
omitted).  An official comment by the California Law Revision Commission to section 2603 
indicates the change was not substantive: “In the second sentence of subdivision (b), the former 
reference to community ‘property’ personal injury damages has been changed to community ‘estate’ 
personal injury damages for internal consistency.”  Family Code, 22 CLRC REP. 1, 259 (1992).  
“Community estate” picks up personal injury damages that are quasi-community property acquired 
during marriage while the spouses where domiciled in another state before taking up domicile in 
California.  Pre-1994 statutory law concerning quasi-community property would have caused such 
damages to be treated the same as true community property.  See Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897 
(Cal. 1965), upholding as constitutional and applying California’s second attempt to create a 
category of quasi-community property in former Civil Code section 140.5, enacted in 1961, and 
quoted at page 899, note 3.  As a result, the trio of 1960 to 1968 decisions (see supra note 144 and 
accompanying text) holding that damages for wrongful death recovered by a spouse were not 
“personal injuries” of the spouse under former section 163.5 of the California Civil Code, 
established the scope of “personal injuries” in today’s Family Code section 2603.  The courts are 
therefore free, even at divorce, to classify a spouse’s wrongful death damages as separate property, 
wholly or in part, in an appropriate case. 
 150.  Moran v. Murtaugh Miller Meyer & Nelson, LLP, 152 P.3d 416, 418 (Cal. 2007) (quoting 
Doner-Griswold v. See (Estate of Griswold), 24 P.3d 1191, 1197–98 (Cal. 2001)); accord O’Connor 
v. Vill. Green Owners Ass’n, 662 P.2d 427, 432 (Cal. 1983) (revision of statute retaining verbatim 
passage that had been judicially construed “represents a legislative endorsement of [that] 
interpretation”); Traverso v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 439 (Ct. App. 
1996) (legislative use of identical language that had been judicially interpreted incorporates that 
interpretation). 
 151.  See supra note 149. 
  152.  See supra note 147. 
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husband upon divorce,153 but treat the funds more like separate property.  
However, section 2603 will have no bearing on whether the expansion of the 
doctrine of in-lieu tracing—discussed below—will lead the California 
Supreme Court to disapprove Keena and similar decisions when the issue is 
classification of wrongful death damages received by a married person. 
VI.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE IN-LIEU TRACING THEORY IN CALIFORNIA 
A. Dictum in a 1908 Decision 
All of the earliest cases applying the theory of in-lieu tracing arose in a 
context in which direct tracing154 could have been employed so that the 
consideration paid for the asset—separate or community—would control its 
classification, but the court concluded that direct tracing would produce an 
improper result.155  In-lieu tracing was first alluded to in confusingly written 
and fleeting dictum in the 1908 California Supreme Court decision Nilson v. 
Sarment.156  The issue was whether a house and lot bought by the husband 
with community funds had become the wife’s separate property when the 
vendor deeded it to the wife alone.157  The party claiming the house was 
 
 153.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004). 
 154.  “Direct tracing” is a term used when the source of an acquisition—usually the consideration 
paid for it—is proved in court and its community or separate nature fixes the separate or community 
classification of the acquisition.  See Murphy v. Murphy (Estate of Murphy), 544 P.2d 956, 964 (Cal. 
1976) (“direct tracing to a separate property source”); Stoll v. Stoll (In re Marriage of Stoll), 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. 1998); Braud v. Braud (In re Marriage of Braud), 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 
195 (Ct. App. 1996); Maggio v. Vahldieck (In re Estate of Luke), 240 Cal. Rptr. 84, 91 (Ct. App. 
1987). 
 155.  Whenever a court declines to classify an item of property acquired by a married person 
based on the community or separate character of funds or other property or labor used to acquire the 
asset but reaches a different classification result by use of in-lieu tracing, a question arises as to 
whether the marital estate that supplied the consideration should be reimbursed for that contribution 
(either with or without interest).  For example, in Thigpen v. Thigpen, 91 So. 2d 12 (La. 1956), the 
husband owned a fractional share of a building as his separate property and used community funds to 
insure the building against fire.  Id. at 22.  It burned down, and in-lieu tracing was used to classify 
the insurance proceeds paid out as the husband’s separate property.  “It may be,” said the court, “that 
the owners of [the building] are indebted to the community for the amount of these premiums[,] but 
no claim is made herein for any such reimbursement.”  Id.  Grace G. Blumberg, Marital Property 
Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers’ Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An 
Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1250, 1281, 1289–90 (1986) (a generally 
useful article on the topic of in-lieu tracing), agrees that reimbursement is appropriate in a case like 
Thigpen but would deny it in other situations where the estate paying the consideration for, but 
getting no ownership interest in, an asset directly traceable to the payment due to a court’s use of in-
lieu tracing could have benefitted from its outlay under a different fact scenario. 
 156.  96 P. 315 (Cal. 1908). 
  157.  Id. at 315.   
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separate property argued that the husband was making a gift of the land to 
his wife as evidenced by terms of the fire insurance coverage—coverage he 
had also bought with community funds—directing any policy proceeds to be 
paid to the wife.158  The court said in response: “If the house and lot, 
although standing in her name, were not her separate property, the 
circumstance that insurance money would have been payable to her in the 
event of loss by fire would not make that money her separate property any 
more than the burnt house was.”159  The suggestion seems to be that the 
insurance proceeds would take on the same classification—community or 
separate—as the insured property that burned down, even though some 
aspects of the policy would lead to a different result. 
B. In-Lieu Tracing in Cases Involving Casualty Insurance 
Nilson was cited as an in-lieu tracing authority in Belmont v. Belmont160 
which appears to be the first case to base a holding on that theory.  A divorce 
court had classified a $85,000 promissory note payable to the husband as 
community property.161  The husband owned a packing house as his separate 
property when he married his wife.162  It burned down, and the intermediate 
appellate court inferred the husband used fire insurance proceeds to re-
establish his packing house business elsewhere.163  The court declared: “The 
proceeds of property insurance take the character of the insured property.  
Nilson v. Sarment, 153 Cal. 524, 529, 96 P. 315 . . . .”164  The husband took 
the $85,000 note upon sale of the re-established business.165  The court of 
appeal held that by tracing back—through the insurance payment—to his 
pre-marriage separate property the husband had overcome the presumption 
that the note acquired during marriage was community property, and the 
judgment had to be reversed.166 
 
  158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 317. 
 160.  10 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Ct. App. 1961). 
  161.  Id. at 229. 
  162.  Id. at 232. 
  163.  Id. 
 164.  Id.  The court did not mention the likelihood that the husband had used community funds to 
acquire the fire insurance coverage. 
  165.  Id.   
 166.  Id. at 233.  Just one year later, in Russell v. Williams, 374 P.2d 827 (Cal. 1962), the 
California Supreme Court may have implicitly disapproved of the 1961 Belmont decision.  In 
Russell, spouses Dorothy and John owned a building in joint tenancy.  Id. at 828.  Dorothy obtained 
a Nevada divorce, and the court made no order dealing with property issues.  John insured the 
structure against loss by fire, using his separate funds.  Id. at 829.  The structure burned down, and 
the insurer paid insurance proceeds to John.  Dorothy contended that “the moneys paid by the 
insurance company under the subject policy constituted proceeds of the property that was destroyed 
and retain the character of that property.”  Not so, held the court.  The insurance contract was 
personal to John: “[T]he proceeds of a fire insurance policy are not a substitute for the property” lost.  
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It is apparent that Belmont’s tracing of the insurance proceeds to the 
property damaged rather than to the premiums paid is logical, particularly 
when one considers that there is little, if any, relationship between the 
proceeds paid and the premiums paid, but there is a direct relationship 
between the proceeds paid and the value of the insured item.167  On the other 
hand, if the insurance policy is taken out as a form of investment, tracing to 
the premium[s] paid is appropriate.  This Article concludes that at least some 
components of an award of damages paid by a tortfeasor to a spouse for the 
wrongful death of a relative, such as his or her child, should be classified as 
the parent-spouse’s separate property.168  But if that spouse used community 
funds to make the most recent premium payment169 on, for example, a 
 
Id.  Belmont was not referred to.  Blumberg, supra note 155, at 1281 n.158, says Russell is 
distinguishable from Belmont because decisions like Russell “do not present any marital property 
issues.”  But, since the Nevada divorce court in Russell, 374 P.2d at 828–29, “made no provision 
respecting any property rights of the parties”—one suspects this was an ex parte divorce, the court 
lacking jurisdictional power to affect property rights—how could the divorce eliminate Belmont’s 
having accorded Dorothy the right to trace the insurance proceeds from a policy bought during 
marriage to the structure burned down, rather than to the consideration paid for the policy, if she had 
a right arising out of the marriage to invoke in-lieu tracing?  That Russell apparently establishes that 
in-lieu tracing does not apply in the context of casualty insurance policy proceeds claimed by 
spouses has little if any bearing on the applicability of the in-lieu tracing principle to the 
classification of wrongful death damages received by a married person, given the California 
Supreme Court’s adoption of in-lieu tracing post-Russell in classification contexts more closely 
relates to the wrongful death damages classification dispute than the classification proceeds of a 
casualty insurance contract.  See infra text accompanying notes 176–212. 
 167.  For example, a $50,000 automobile bought with a husband’s separate property cash could be 
totally destroyed in a wreck occurring shortly after he paid $250 for an initial collision insurance 
premium with community funds, resulting in a payment from the insurer 200 times more than the 
sum paid with community funds.  In Jackson v. Jackson (In re Marriage of Jackson), 260 Cal. Rptr. 
508 (Ct. App. 1989), the spouses used community funds to buy automobile insurance with $300,000 
in uninsured motorist coverage.  Id. at 509.  The wife was then injured in an accident tortiously 
caused by an uninsured driver, and the insurer paid $85,000 to the wife’s medical providers and 
$225,000 to the wife and her attorney.  Id.  At divorce the issue was whether assets bought with the 
funds paid to the wife by the insurer were ordinary community property subject to 50-50 division, 
which they would be under direct tracing to the community funds used to pay premiums or were 
received by the wife in lieu of a tort case settlement that the tortfeasor or his insurer might have 
made in favor of the wife, since such settlement payments would have been awardable entirely to her 
at divorce under former section 4800(b)(4) of the California Civil Code (current version at CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 2603(b) (West 2004)).  Id. at 511.  The court held for the wife under the in-lieu tracing 
theory, stating: “The fact community funds were used to pay the premiums on the Fireman’s policy 
does not compel a contrary result. . . .  [U]ninsured motorist coverage is not an item of protection in 
most instances which a member of the consuming public consciously seeks out and buys.”  Id. at 512 
(internal quotations omitted).  In other words, the spouses did not view the premiums as making an 
investment in uninsured motorist coverage. 
 168.  See infra text accompanying notes 250–85. 
 169.  In California, with term insurance each premium paid is viewed as buying a distinct 
contract, unless the insured has become medically uninsurable—not the case in the hypothetical in 
the text—so that the separate or community character of previous premium payments is disregarded 
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$500,000 term life insurance policy on the same child, proceeds paid upon 
the death of the child should be traced to the community payment, as that 
sum is governed by the terms of the investment, and that sum is not related 
to the actual pecuniary loss suffered by the parent upon his or her child’s 
death.170 
C. In-Lieu Tracing Is Applied in Employee-Benefit Cases 
Certain contracts that provide for employee severance benefits 
constitute another area where California courts use in-lieu tracing, although 
direct tracing could be used to classify payments made under the contract to 
a married person as community or separate property (or a bit of both).171  For 
example, if severance benefits are provided for in an employment contract 
made before actual termination of the spouse-employee’s job was a 
consideration, direct tracing is applied, and the court would look to the 
amount of community and separate labor under the employment contract 
that earned the benefit.172  On the other hand, if the right to severance benefit 
is created in a contract negotiated when the employer was instituting a 
separation plan and encouraging certain employees to take early retirement, 
in-lieu tracing is employed to make the classification of benefits, even 
though prior service (i.e., labor by the employee spouse) is a condition of 
eligibility to receive the benefit.173  The payments to the employee are 
viewed as in lieu of lost earnings he or she incurs while seeking new 
employment.174  If the employee taking early retirement is permanently 
separated from his or her spouse when the benefits are paid so that the 
 
in classifying the proceeds.  See Elfmont v. Elfmont (In re Marriage of Elfmont), 891 P.2d 136, 142 
(Cal. 1995); see also Pritchard v. Logan (In re Estate of Logan), 236 Cal. Rptr. 368, 372, 372 n.8 
(Ct. App. 1987). 
 170.  The $500,000 proceeds from the term life insurance policy should be community even if, 
perchance, the parent-spouse also obtained a $500,000 wrongful death judgment against the 
tortfeasor responsible for the death of the child, on which the plaintiff was unable to recover from 
the judgment-proof and uninsured defendant.  In selecting a $500,000 policy paid for with 
community funds, the parent-spouse could not have foreseen that such would be the amount of loss 
resulting from the death of the child, as the timing of that death was completely uncertain.  The 
purpose of buying the policy was primarily investment. 
 171.  See generally Lehman v. Lehman (In re Marriage of Lehman), 955 P.2d 451, 456–59 (Cal. 
1998). 
 172.  See, e.g., Horn v. Horn (In re Marriage of Horn), 226 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(discussing how a severance benefits provision included in union-negotiated employment contract 
made two years before termination of employee became an issue). 
 173.  See, e.g., Frahm v. Frahm (In re Marriage of Frahm), 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31, 35 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(only employees with one year of service to the employer eligible under the early retirement contract 
plan); Lawson v. Lawson (In re Marriage of Lawson), 256 Cal. Rptr. 283, 285 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(amount of severance benefit tied to total period of employment, including time while married); 
DeShurley v. DeShurley (In re Marriage of DeShurley), 255 Cal. Rptr. 150, 150 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(same). 
  174.  See Lawson, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 288. 
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living-apart statute applies, the benefits are classified as separate property, 
although they would not have been paid but for substantial community labor 
by the employee spouse.175 
D. In-Lieu Tracing Appears in Cases Involving Personal Injuries Suffered 
by Married Persons 
1.  Marriage of Jones 
For purposes of this Article’s conclusion concerning classification of 
wrongful death damages received by a married person, the most significant 
expansion of the use of in-lieu tracing is into classifying statutory or 
contractually-promised compensation payments arising out of a married 
person’s suffering personal injuries or otherwise becoming disabled.  The 
first decision to employ in-lieu tracing in this context was In re Marriage of 
Jones,176 decided by the California Supreme Court in 1975.  There the 
husband entered U.S. military service in 1957, married his wife in 1964, and 
lost a leg in active duty in Vietnam in 1969.177  Under a statutory scheme 
providing for disability pay, the husband’s community labor in combat 
helped him qualify for a disability award178 tied to his years of service.179  
The California Supreme Court rejected the wife’s direct-tracing contention 
that the award was 5/12 community because it was earned in part by 
community labor.180  Rather, employing in-lieu tracing, the court held that 
the divorcing husband’s disability benefits arose from “the personal anguish 
caused by the permanent disability as well as . . . from his compelled 
premature military retirement and from diminished ability to compete in the 
civilian job market.”181 
 
  175.  See id. 
 176.  531 P.2d 420 (Cal. 1975). 
  177.  Id. at 421. 
 178.  Id. at 422. 
 179.  Id. at 423. 
  180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 421.  The Jones court also declared: “Pain, suffering, disfigurement or the loss of a 
limb, as here, is the peculiar anguish of the person who suffers it; it can never be wholly shared even 
by a loving spouse and surely not after the dissolution of a marriage by a departed one.”  Id. at 424.  
Jones also found support for its holding in the statute then in effect in California concerning the 
classification of personal injuries; the statute looked to marital status at the time of the receipt of 
monetary damages rather than the time of injury to classify them as community or separate property,  
with the issue in Jones being whether the wife had any interest in disability benefits to be paid post-
divorce when the community had ceased to exist.  Id.  The time-of-receipt statute was enacted in 
1968 as former section 169.3 of the California Civil Code, 1968 Cal. Stat. 1079, which had been 
renumbered by 1975, when Jones was decided, as Civil Code section 5126, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3342.  
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2.  Marriage of Saslow 
In re Marriage of Saslow,182 decided by the California Supreme Court in 
1985, differed from Jones in that in Saslow the husband’s right to receive 
disability payments was not a benefit automatically attached to his 
employment status but instead arose out of a private contract he had 
voluntarily entered into.183  The husband had used only community funds to 
obtain the contractual coverage, but that played no controlling role in the 
court’s classification of benefits.184  The court held that a determination 
should be made as to whether the husband’s intention in entering into the 
contract was (1) to obtain a replacement for future lost earnings during a 
period where he would have been working if not disabled or, (2) to obtain a 
pension supplement for a period of time after he would have retired.185  If his 
intent was the latter, the court would employ direct tracing to premiums 
paid; if the former, under in-lieu tracing, insurance payments received prior 
to the contemplated age of retirement, when the husband was living separate 
and apart from his wife and after the divorce, would be his separate property, 
even though the coverage was purchased with community funds.186 
3.  Marriage of McDonald 
A few months after Jones, the 1975 court of appeal decision, In re 
Marriage of McDonald,187 relied on Jones—also a 1975 decision—in 
applying the in-lieu tracing theory to classify a husband’s workers’ 
compensation award as his separate property.188  The court found that the 
money paid to the injured worker would replace his lost earnings after 
 
Effective 1980, the legislature removed the time-of-receipt test from former section 1526 in favor of 
a time-of-injury analysis.  1979 Cal. Stat. 1971.  Although the California Supreme Court has 
departed from some aspects of Jones, as in Saslow v. Saslow (In re Marriage of Saslow), 710 P.2d 
346, 346–49 (Cal. 1985) (noting at page 349, the 1979 revision of former section 5126 of the 
California Civil Code), Jones has been favorably cited post-1980 by both the state supreme court and 
courts of appeal for its holding that disability benefits are to be classified using the in-lieu tracing 
approach rather than direct tracing.  See, e.g., Elfmont v. Elfmont (In re Marriage of Elfmont), 891 
P.2d 136, 142 (Cal. 1995); Raphael v. Bloomfield, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583, 586–87 (Ct. App. 2003).  
These citations of Jones indicate that the judge-made in-lieu tracing approach, and not former 
section 1526, is now considered to be the basis for the separate property classification in Jones. 
 182.  Saslow, 710 P.2d 346. 
  183.  Id. at 348. 
  184.  Id. at 350–52.  
 185.  Id. at 351–52.  But see Rossin v. Rossin (In re Marriage of Rossin), 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427 (Ct. 
App. 2009) (holding that the wife’s intent in buying a private policy of disability insurance was not 
to be considered and instead direct tracing to separate funds used to pay premiums controlled 
classification of benefits where the policy was fully paid for and the wife had begun to receive 
benefits before marrying the husband).   
  186.  Saslow, 710 P.2d at 352. 
 187.  125 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Ct. App. 1975). 
  188.  Id. at 162. 
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separation from his wife and after divorce and therefore should be classified 
as his separate property.189  The McDonald court disregarded the likelihood 
that the injured spouse qualified for an award under the state’s statutory no-
fault scheme of workers’ compensation based on community labor (i.e., 
direct tracing was eschewed).190 
4.  Marriage of Fisk 
At the time of the McDonald and Jones decisions, the California statute 
dealing with classification of personal injury damages provided that such 
damages would be the victim-spouse’s separate property if received after the 
payee began living separate and apart from his spouse, which was the fact 
pattern in McDonald and Jones.191  Accordingly, the court in McDonald did 
not have to decide whether the workers’ compensation award constituted 
personal injury damages under the statute, because holding that the statute 
did apply would not have changed the result: both the statute and the judge-
made in-lieu tracing theory would classify the award as the husband’s 
separate property.192  However, between McDonald and the date of the 
husband’s injury in the 1992 court of appeal decision In re Marriage of 
Fisk,193 former Civil Code section 4800(b)(4), the classification statute, was 
rewritten to provide that a married person’s personal injury damages would 
be community property “if the cause of action for the damages arose during 
the marriage” and before separation; this abrogated the prior rule that receipt 
of the damages after separation would require classifying personal injury 
damages as the separate property of the victim-spouse.194 
In Fisk, the husband suffered an on-the-job injury two years before 
separation, although the workers’ compensation award was paid to him after 
he began living separate and apart from his wife.195  The wife argued that the 
husband’s workers’ compensation award was, in the language of section 
4800(b)(4), “‘money or other property received . . . by a person in 
satisfaction of a judgment for damages for his or her personal 
 
 189.  Id.  The court observed that a workers’ compensation award “does not . . . include pain and 
suffering as personal injury damages do,” as did the statutory disability pay award in Jones, but this 
difference did not serve as a basis for distinguishing Jones and its use of in-lieu tracing.  Id. 
  190.  Id. at 161–62. 
  191.  Id. at 160; see Jones v. Jones (In re Marriage of Jones), 531 P.2d 420 (Cal. 1975); 1979 Cal. 
Stat. 1971. 
  192.  See McDonald, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 160. 
 193.  4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 95 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 194.  This provision was first enacted in 1979 as part of subdivision (c) of section 4800.  1979 
Cal. Stat. 1971; see also Fisk, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 n.4. 
 195.  Fisk, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97. 
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injuries . . . .’”196  Fisk held that a “workers’ compensation permanent 
disability award is not a satisfaction of judgment for damages in an action at 
 law . . . .”197  Because it did not include a pain-and-suffering component, the 
workers’ compensation award differed from a tort judgment based on a 
plaintiff’s suffering personal injuries.198  In addition it was “significant” that 
the statute applied “only to judgments.”199  That is, the legislature’s choice 
of the word “judgment” to the exclusion of “award” was deliberate.200  Since 
no statute addressed the issue in Fisk of classifying workers’ compensation 
awards, the court held that the judge-made rule of in-lieu tracing was 
applicable, and the payments were the husband’s separate property.201 
5.  Raphael v. Bloomfield 
Raphael v. Bloomfield202 expanded on the in-lieu tracing of Fisk by 
apportioning a workers’ compensation award into community and separate 
property components.203  In Raphael, the wife was permanently disabled by 
a job-related injury and received a lump sum workers’ compensation award 
of $311,859.04 six months before she began living separate and apart from 
her husband.204  At divorce, the trial court classified all of the award as 
community property because the wife received it before separation, and the 
 
 196.  Id. at 100 n.4 (quoting 1979 Cal. Stat. 1971).  The wife also argued in Fisk that if the 
workers’ compensation award was to be classified as the husband’s separate property, the 
community (and the wife as to half) was entitled to reimbursement for community funds spent on 
care of the injured husband during the seven months he was unable to work (prior to the receipt of 
the award), under former California Civil Code section 5126(b).  Id.  This reimbursement claim was 
legally valid if, in the language of former section 5126(a), the husband’s workers’ compensation 
award was “money or other property received . . . in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for 
personal injuries,” the identical language of former section 4800(b)(4) of the California Civil Code.  
Id.  The Fisk court’s analysis applied to the phrase as used in both sections 4800(b)(4) and 5126(a).  
Id.  
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. at 100.  “Moreover,” added the court, “workers’ compensation is awarded without regard 
to fault.”  Id.  However, that seems not to be a basis for distinguishing such awards from tort 
judgments based on similar personal injuries.  For example, if stored dynamite exploded at a place of 
business injuring a spouse who was on the job as an employee there as well as a non-employee 
visitor, both victims could recover for lost wages resulting from their injuries on a no-fault basis—
the visitor in a strict liability tort suit in a court of law and the employee under the workers’ 
compensation statutes via an administrative tribunal.  See Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 
1165 (Cal. 1978) (strict liability in tort originated as a limited concept imposed, “for example, upon 
keepers of wild animals, or those who handled explosives or other dangerous substances, or who 
engaged in ultrahazardous activities”).   
  199.  Fisk, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100. 
  200.  See id. 
  201.  Id. at 100–01. 
 202.  6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583 (Ct. App. 2003). 
  203.  Id. at 590. 
 204.  Id. at 584. 
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court did not employ in-lieu tracing.205  The court of appeal reversed, 
holding that precedents such as Jones, McDonald, and Fisk required it to 
“examine[] the purpose of the disability payments.”206  After such an 
inquiry, the court in Raphael stated that “a lump sum permanent disability 
award received prior to separation is the injured spouse’s separate property 
to the extent it is meant to compensate for the injured spouse’s diminished 
earning capacity (and/or medical expenses) after separation.”207  The court 
concluded: 
To the extent a portion of the lump sum award represented benefits 
that, in the absence of wife’s settlement, would have been paid prior 
to the parties’ separation (i.e., the weekly disability payments she 
would have received from the time of the settlement until 
separation), those payments would be community property . . . .208 
Raphael can be explained only if the community got a present, 
defeasible estate and the wife a future interest (an executory interest).  The 
community or separate “character of property is determined by its status at 
the time of its acquisition.”209  In Raphael the lump sum award—viewed as a 
present interest in property acquired during marriage and before 
separation—had to be 100% community property because it was then 
unknown whether the spouses would separate or divorce or their marriage 
would terminate by death before all the funds were expended.210  In essence, 
Raphael holds that, at the time of acquisition, while the community received 
a present interest, the wife’s separate estate received a future interest—a 
springing executory interest that would become a present possessory 
 
 205.  Id. at 585. 
 206.  Id. at 586. 
 207.  Id. at 587; accord Hatcher v. Hatcher, 933 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (portion of 
lump sum workers’ compensation award based on permanent disability received by spouse during 
marriage viewed as a replacement for post-divorce earnings became separate property at divorce); 
Cupp v. Cupp (In re Marriage of Cupp), 730 P.2d 870, 872 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (same). 
 208.  Raphael, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590.  According to Ruiz v. Ruiz (In re Marriage of Ruiz), 122 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 914, 916–17 (Ct. App. 2011), Raphael places the burden on the injured spouse of 
proving how much of a lump sum workers’ compensation award she received is not community 
property but rather is separate property received in lieu of wages that would have been paid or 
medical bills that would have been incurred after the spouses permanently separated. 
 209.  In re Miller, 187 P.2d 722, 726 (Cal. 1947); see also Buol v. Buol (In re Marriage of Buol), 
705 P.2d 354, 357 (Cal. 1985) (“The status of property as community or separate is normally 
determined at the time of its acquisition.” (quoting Bouquet v. Bouquet (In re Marriage of Bouquet), 
546 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Cal. 1976))).  Miller goes on to say after the quotation in text: “Subsequent 
changes in the form of the property do not alter its nature as separate or community.”  187 P.2d at 
726. 
  210.  See Raphael, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590. 
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interest,211 and divest the community estate (which held a fee simple subject 
to an executory interest), should the wife and husband begin to live separate 
and apart.212 
E. In-Lieu Tracing Should Be Employed in All Tort Recovery Cases Where 
a Statute Does Not Dictate the Classification Approach 
1.  Two Statutes Bar Use of In-Lieu Tracing 
The foregoing consideration of the history of classifying personal injury 
funds received by a married person as separate or community property and 
 
 211.  Such a theory is also necessary to explain Saslow v. Saslow (In re Marriage of Saslow), 710 
P.2d 346 (Cal. 1985).  See supra text accompanying notes 182–86.  Any present interest in the 
contract rights against the insurance company issuing the disability policy to the husband there could 
only be community property at the time the disability insurance contracts were entered into, as no 
permanent separation of the spouses or termination of their marriage could be predicted at that time.  
See Saslow, 710 P.2d at 357.  Under one of the disability insurance contracts acquired by the 
husband, payments would commence being made to him upon his becoming disabled, would be 
reduced when he attained age seventy-five, and would continue to be made at the reduced rate until 
his death.  Id. at 347–48.  On remand from the supreme court, the trial court was to determine at 
what age the spouses envisioned the husband ceasing work and retiring.  Id. at 352–53.  If that were 
found to be age sixty-five, the classification of community and separate interests at the time of 
acquisition of this policy would be as follows: The community received a present interest, which, 
under the estate system for classifying interests in property, would be a fee simple subject to an 
executory interest.  Id.  As community property, this present interest would be subject to equal 
management by the husband and wife, CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(a) (West 2004), unless the wife 
agreed contractually to sole management by the husband.  The husband’s separate estate received 
when the disability insurance contract was purchased a future interest in the form of an executory 
interest that might or might not become possessory.  Permanent separation of the spouses after the 
husband became disabled before age sixty-five—or a divorce or the wife’s death after such disability 
occurred and before husband was sixty-five—would result, due to application of in-lieu tracing, in 
the community’s present interest being divested and the husband’s separately-owned executory 
interest becoming possessory.  But when the contract was made, the community estate also received 
not just a present interest but its own future interest, an executory interest that could divest in whole 
or in part the separate estate of the husband that became possessory when his executory interest was 
converted into a present interest.  Because the spouses agreed to buy a flow of funds to be paid after 
the husband became sixty-five—the date on which the spouses thought he would retire—the law 
would treat the spouses as acquiring a supplemental pension to be paid to him beginning on his 
sixty-fifth birthday.  See Saslow, 710 P.2d at 357.  These benefits would be classified by direct 
tracing, not in-lieu tracing.  If only community funds had been paid to the insurance company, the 
flow of money paid after the husband became sixty-five would be community property, even though 
the spouses were permanently separated, due to direct tracing.  If the husband turned sixty-five after 
a divorce, the flow of money thereafter would be former community property owned by the ex-
spouses in tenancy in common unless the divorce court had specifically dealt with this potential flow 
of money in which the community had an interest under direct tracing.  The ex-wife’s tenancy in 
common interest would be subject to her sole management (unless, again, she had waived 
management powers by joining in the disability insurance contract as a party to waive management 
power).  If the ex-husband became sixty-five after his marriage ended by his wife’s death, he might 
own the flow of money as tenant in common with the wife’s legatee under her will.   
 212.  Under in-lieu tracing theory, if at the time of such a final separation some medical bills 
arising out of the wife’s injury remained unpaid, the community ought not to be divested of 
sufficient funds to pay such bills. 
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of the development of in-lieu tracing in the classification of such funds 
establishes the following: (1) The California Supreme Court realizes that 
classifying 100% of a married person’s personal injury recovery as 
community property is quite illogical, as some of the funds compensate for 
harm that is personal in nature, such as pain and suffering.213  But, (2) two 
statutes, Family Code section 2603, applicable at divorce, and section 780, 
applicable during marriage, apparently214 will be viewed as legislative 
barriers to correcting the illogical classification with respect to “personal 
injury damages.”  Notably, however, (3) that statutory term is narrowly 
interpreted.215  (4) In-lieu tracing will be applied if a married person has 
received funds to compensate for personal injuries and neither of these two 
statutes applies where the funds are traceable either to a disability insurance 
policy or to an award by a workers’ compensation tribunal.  Then, (5) the 
lump sum will be broken down into component parts (6) with some 
classified as community property and some as the victim-spouse’s separate 
property, as was done in Raphael, the 2003 workers’ compensation case.216 
Workers’ compensation awards are based on strict liability theory.217  A 
wrongful death cause of action is statutory and usually sounds in 
negligence,218 although recovery has been granted on a strict liability 
theory.219  But when the issue is whether in-lieu tracing is appropriate, the 
 
 213.  See supra text accompanying notes 124–29, 132–35. 
 214.  Recall that courts in Louisiana and Texas, dealing with statutes that on their face seemed to 
require classification of all or some components of a spouse’s recovery of personal injury damages 
as the victim’s separate property, concluded that the statutes did not bar them from classifying 
certain components as community property by use of the judge-made in-lieu tracing theory.  See 
supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  I think it unlikely that a California court would undercut 
a clear legislative directive as has happened in Louisiana and Texas. 
 215.  See supra text accompanying notes 146–50; see also supra text accompanying notes 196–
200.  On the other hand, Klug v. Klug (In re Marriage of Klug), 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 332 (Ct. App. 
2005), construed the term damages for “personal injuries” as used in section 781 of the California 
Family Code (companion statute to section 780, which Klug necessarily would have construed 
similarly) and section 2603 very broadly.  Damages for “personal injuries” as used in these statutes 
was held to embrace a wife’s recovery of money damages based on a legal malpractice claim against 
her attorney, who had assisted her husband in secretly hiding $2 million worth of community 
property assets in offshore accounts!  Id. at 337.  Surely such an interpretation of “personal injuries” 
is untenable.   
  216.  Raphael v. Bloomfield, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583 (Ct. App. 2003), discussed supra in text 
accompanying notes 202–12. 
  217.  See, e.g., Bell v. Indus. Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266, 272 (Cal. 1981). 
  218.  See, e.g., Helling v. Lew, 104 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Ct. App. 1972). 
 219.  The term “wrongful act” in what is now section 377.60 of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure (West 2004 & Supp. 2011), which defines the California wrongful death action, is 
construed to mean any tortious act, so that the wrongful death plaintiff can base his or her claim on a 
theory of strict liability in tort, thereby not having to prove fault by the defendant.  See, e.g., Barrett 
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fact that most wrongful death cases involve negligence seems to provide no 
sound basis for distinguishing Raphael’s use of in-lieu tracing220 to classify 
personal injury damages arising out of a statutorily based claim (workers’ 
compensation) based on no-fault principles.  Note, too, the similarity that in 
both wrongful death and workers’ compensation claims, damages do not 
include a pain and suffering component.221 
2.  Keena Can Be Overturned by the Court of Appeal 
It follows, then, that Keena is truly ripe for judicial abrogation, insofar 
as it bars tracing a wrongful death cause of action to the type of loss the 
damages are intended to compensate.222  The California Supreme Court 
should disapprove the entire line of Keena-based precedents.  Moreover, 
because “there is no horizontal stare decisis in the California Court of 
Appeal,”223 it appears that each court of appeal in the state is authorized to 
jettison these precedents without waiting for the California Supreme Court 
to do so.224  Although the California Supreme Court did indicate approval of 
Keena’s result by appending an “Opinion of the Supreme Court Denying 
Hearing” to the court of appeal opinion,225 because it did not grant a hearing, 
the opinion is not supreme court precedent.226  Moreover, the opinion was 
not published in the California Reports, which collect precedents of the 
California Supreme Court, but in the California Appellate Reports, where 
decisions of the courts of appeal appear. 
 
v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304, 307 (Ct. App. 1990) (strict liability for death caused by 
defective product, a piece of earth-moving equipment). 
  220.  Raphael, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 590. 
 221.  See supra note 198; see also infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
  222.  For a discussion of Keena, see supra Part III.A. 
 223.  Sarti v. Salt Creek Ltd., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 2008); accord Jessen v. Mentor 
Corp., 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 714, 721 (Ct. App. 2008) (court not bound by contrary decision of different 
division within the Second District); McCallum v. McCallum, 235 Cal. Rptr. 396, 400 n.4 (Ct. App. 
1987) (court of appeal not bound to follow decision out of a different district); 9 WITKIN, 
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 498, at 558–60 (5th ed. 2008). 
 224.  The technical terminology of the process is this: The California Supreme Court would 
“disapprove” these cases.  If Division One of the First Appellate District, which decided Keena, 
were to clean up the law in this area, it would “overrule” Keena and “decline to follow,” due to 
erroneous reasoning, decisions of other courts of appeal.  See, e.g., supra note 65 (cases holding in 
accordance with Keena that 100% of a wrongful death recovery received by a spouse had to be 
community property because tracing beyond the accrual of the cause of action was not allowed). 
 225.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 226.  See Thompson v. Dep’t of Corr., 18 P.3d 1198, 1202 (Cal. 2001) (dealing with an order to 
stay execution of a death sentence made without granting a hearing, where the court declared: 
“[U]nlike our decisions rendered after granting review, hearing oral argument, and preparing a 
written opinion, our minute orders are not binding precedent.”); see also Leonard Donald Dungan, 
Comment, Courts: Significance of the Practice of the California Supreme Court of Commenting on 
the Opinion of the District Court of Appeal When Denying a Hearing After Judgment, 28 CALIF. L. 
REV. 81, 87 (1939) (“The statements of the court [in denying a hearing] that it approves . . . of part 
of the opinion below seem to be no more than dicta . . . .”). 
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Additionally, the California Supreme Court’s statement in Flores v. 
Brown that a spouse’s recovery for wrongful death is community property227 
is clearly dictum and not binding on the courts of appeal, as the Flores 
holding was that after a marriage is dissolved by death, the cause of action in 
the surviving parent is separate property;228 the court had no need to 
comment on the pre-dissolution status of the cause of action.  The California 
Supreme Court’s similar statement in Fuentes v. Tucker229 about a wrongful 
death recovery being community property was apparently also dictum.230  
The court stated that because the husband was the sole manager of the 
community, it was error to have permitted the wife/mother of the decedent to 
be a party to the suit; however, the court actually held that the defendant 
suffered no prejudice,231 which meant that the court did not have to decide if 
the cause of action was community property. 
VII. APPLYING IN-LIEU TRACING TO THE SEVERAL COMPONENTS THAT  
CAN MAKE UP A WRONGFUL DEATH MONEY JUDGMENT 
A. The Texas Precedents 
Texas courts first employed in-lieu tracing to classify wrongful death 
damages received by a married person in 1900 in Bohan v. Bohan.232  The 
court there explained why its decision earlier that year, Brush Electric Light 
& Power Co. v. Lefevre,233 had not abolished the rule that in personal injury 
cases the contributory negligence of one spouse would be imputed to the 
other spouse to bar recovery of damages, if the recovery would have been 
community property co-owned by the negligent spouse.234  In Lefevre, the 
mother’s wrongful death recovery was her separate property: 
When it is remembered that young Lefevre was over 21 years of age 
at the time of his death, and whatever he might have contributed 
towards the support of his mother, had he lived, would have been a 
gift to her, and clearly her separate property, it seems equally clear 
 
 227.  See supra text accompanying note 70. 
 228.  Flores v. Brown, 248 P.2d 922, 925, 927 (Cal. 1952). 
  229.  187 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1947). 
 230.  See supra text accompanying note 66. 
  231.  Fuentes, 187 P.2d at 758. 
 232.  56 S.W. 959 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1900) (no writ). 
 233.  Brush Electric Light & Power Co. v. Lefevre, 55 S.W. 396 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 
1900), rev’d on another ground, 57 S.W. 640 (Tex. 1900). 
  234.  Bohan, 56 S.W. at 960. 
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that the amount awarded the mother by the jury in lieu of, or as 
compensation for, the loss of such probable contributions by the 
son, would also be her separate property.235 
In the more recent wrongful death case where in-lieu tracing was 
employed, Johnson v. Holly Farms of Texas, Inc.,236 decided in 1987, the 
jury in the wife’s suit for wrongful death of her minor daughter was 
instructed that it could award damages consisting of three components: “(1) 
pecuniary loss; (2) loss of companionship; and (3) mental pain and 
anguish.”237  Because the husband’s contributory negligence was an issue, 
the mother/wife would obtain a full recovery only if each damage 
component was correctly classified by the trial court as her separate 
property.238  The intermediate appellate court so held.  Pecuniary loss 
consisted of 
the care, maintenance, support, services, advice, counsel and 
contributions of pecuniary value that the child would have given the 
parent.  Each of those items is in the nature of a gift from the 
child . . . [and we] classify that kind of pecuniary loss as the 
separate property of the spouse suffering the loss.239 
Holly Farms classified the loss of companionship damages awarded to the 
wife as her separate property by following Texas Court of Appeals 
precedent240 that based its classification on a Texas Supreme Court decision, 
Whittlesey v. Miller.241 Whittlesey had held that damages recovered by a 
wife’s asserting a loss of her husband’s consortium claim due to his 
tortiously-inflicted physical injuries were her separate property because they 
were a “personal injury recovery” under a Texas classification statute (now 
section 3.001(3) of the Texas Family Code).242 
 
 235.  Id.  Texas courts in wrongful death cases do not face the possibility that gifts the deceased 
child was precluded from making due to being tortiously killed might have generated community 
property.  See Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472, 477–78 (1883).  Unlike the law in California (see supra 
note 105), in Texas if a donor makes a gift jointly to a husband and wife, they do not hold the 
property in community, but each spouse takes an undivided half interest as separate property (i.e., 
tenancy in common property is created).   
 236.  Johnson v. Holly Farms of Tex., Inc., 731 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987) (no 
writ). 
 237.  Id. at 646. 
  238.  Id. at 646–47. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 678 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984), aff’d, 699 
S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985).  The Texas court of appeals said: “We see no practical distinction between 
the loss of spousal consortium and the loss of companionship of children; both constitute damage to 
emotional interests.”  Id. at 210. 
 241.  572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978). 
 242.  Id. at 669; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.001(3) (West 2006). 
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Finally, Holly Farms classified the damages recovered for mental pain 
and anguish based on a Texas Supreme Court decision, Graham v. 
Franco,243 which declared that even without the statute calling for a separate 
property classification of personal injury damages, principles of in-lieu 
tracing would require Texas courts to reach the same result as to recovery 
for pain and suffering through judge-made law.244 
In sum, in Holly Farms, all of the components of damages recovered by 
a married person based on the wrongful death of a family member were 
classified as separate property of the payee.  This was based on: (1) the 
court’s own in-lieu tracing analysis for loss of financial contributions from 
the decedent, and (2) precedents that classified certain elements of personal 
injury damages recovered by the victim-spouse as separate property when 
the tort involved the spouse herself and not a tortiously killed family 
member.245  Each such precedent employed in-lieu tracing based on the 
Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of what is now Texas Family Code 
section 3.001(3)246 or on the Texas Supreme Court’s statement as to what the 
judge-made law would be in the absence of that statute. 
 
 243.  488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972); see Holly Farms, 731 S.W.2d at 646 (citing Graham). 
 244.  Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 394.  The issue of what the classification rule would be without the 
statute arose in Graham because article 16, section 15, of the Texas constitution is construed as 
barring the Texas legislature from enacting statutes that depart from the basic Spanish-Mexican law 
of 1840 with respect to what constituted separate and community property.  See Arnold v. Leonard, 
273 S.W. 799 (Tex. 1925).  The Texas Supreme Court had previously in Ezell v. Dodson, 60 Tex. 
331 (1883), used McFadden-type “logic” (focusing on the marital status of the tort victim-spouse 
when she or he suffered personal injuries) to classify all personal injury damages received by a 
spouse after a tort during marriage as community property.  If Ezell was consistent with civil law, 
then the statute seeking to reverse its holding violated article 16, section 15.  Graham quoted the 
community property treatises by McKay and De Funiak, see supra notes 42, 54, 121, to conclude 
“that injuries to the wife were her separate right under the Spanish and Mexican law upon which our 
system of community property law was based.”  Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 394.  Graham also quoted 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill. 260, 264 (1869), which traced the cause 
of action for personal injuries to the body of the spouse that she brought to the marriage: “‘Who is 
the natural owner of the right?  Not the husband, because the injury did not accrue to him; it was 
wholly personal to the wife.  It was her body that was bruised; it was she who suffered the agonizing 
mental and physical pain.’”  Graham, 488 S.W.2d at 393–94. 
  245.  Holly Farms, 731 S.W.2d at 646–47. 
 246.  See supra text accompanying note 52 describing the Texas Supreme Court’s engrafting onto 
this statute a rule that the portion of the recovery for the victim-spouse’s medical bills that would 
reimburse the community for having paid such expenses or relieve the community of its obligation 
to pay such expenses in the future should be classified as community property. 
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B. Applying In-Lieu Tracing to Classify the Components of a California 
Wrongful Death Recovery 
According to the recent California Supreme Court decision in Corder v. 
Corder,247 damages recoverable in a wrongful death suit fall into two broad 
categories: (1) direct “financial benefits” to the plaintiff from the decedent 
“‘reasonably to be expected in the future, and (2) the monetary equivalent of 
loss of comfort, society and protection’” arising out of the death.248  The first 
category is comprised of several distinct types of financial benefits.  Unlike 
Texas, which recognizes a third broad category of wrongful death damages, 
the California Supreme Court does not recognize Texas’s third category and  
instead bars California courts from granting recovery “for the grief or sorrow 
attendant upon the death of a loved one.”249 
1.  Loss of Direct Financial Benefits 
a.  Lost Bequests, Devises and Inheritances by Intestate Succession 
“[T]here might be a reasonable expectation that if the life of a deceased 
had continued he might have accumulated a greater estate, and that the 
increased estate would have been inherited by the statutory beneficiaries as 
his heirs.”250  Wrongful death damages recovered by a married person based 
on the theory that, but for the death, the married person would have acquired 
the property by intestate succession at the decedent’s death at a normal age 
should be classified under the in-lieu tracing approach as the lost inheritance 
would have been classified.  Usually it would be separate property of the 
heir/spouse.251 
Suppose, however, the decedent were the child or grandchild of the 
husband and wife suing for wrongful death, the decedent’s sole heirs, who 
would take an inheritance “equally” under section 6402(b) of the California 
Probate Code.252  The statute does not say how the husband and wife take 
equally, but equality could exist in these three ways: (1) if each took a 
distinct portion of the estate as his or her separate property, (2) if they took 
 
 247.  Corder v. Corder, 161 P.3d 172 (Cal. 2007). 
 248.  Id. at 183 (quoting Benwell v. Dean, 57 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (Ct. App. 1967)). 
 249.  Id.  Accord Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1028 (Cal. 1977) (no compensation for 
“sorrow and distress . . . .  ‘Nothing can be recovered as a solatium for wounded feelings.’” (quoting 
Ure v. Maggio Bros. Co., 75 P.2d 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938))). 
 250.  Corder, 161 P.3d at 183. 
 251.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(2) (West 2004).  
 252.  Subsection (b) of section 6402 applies if the intestate takers are parents of the decedent.  
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(b) (West 2009).  Subsection (d) calls for grandparents who are the closest 
kin of the decedent to take “equally.”  Id. § 6402(d).  It is also theoretically possible that the husband 
and wife could be collateral co-heirs of the intestate, each being, for example, decedent’s second 
cousin.  As the decedent’s closest kin they would take “equally” under subsection (d). 
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the inheritance as community property,253 or (3) if they took the inheritance 
50-50 as tenants in common.  The statute defining an inheritance received by 
a married person during marriage as the person’s separate property addresses 
an inheritance received by “a” and “the” married person in the singular254 
and therefore possibly could be construed as not applicable where the 
husband and wife were co-equal heirs.  De Funiak argues that such a statute 
should be construed so as to be consistent with the civil law of Spain and 
Mexico from which California’s community property regime was derived 
and under which the spouses as co-heirs would own the inheritance as 
community property.255  If the California courts agree with De Funiak, 
wrongful death damages received by either256 or both of the spouses in lieu 
of a community property inheritance should be classified as community 
property. 
The same analysis applies to bequests and devises that the plaintiff-
spouse or spouses prove they lost due to the tortiously-caused death of a 
decedent.  If the decedent had a will—or had been proved to have decided 
on making a will—with an open-ended bequest or devise to the wife or 
husband alone (such as “all my personalty”), the future acquisitions of the 
decedent that would have passed through the will had the decedent not died 
prematurely would have been the separate property of the party recovering 
damages for wrongful death.257  Under in-lieu tracing, damages awarded due 
to property not passing via such a will would likewise be separate property. 
On the other hand, consider a decedent whose will made a joint devise 
in equal shares to a husband and wife—the plaintiffs in the wrongful death 
suit—and whose will did not specify whether they were to take the property 
as community property, tenancy in common, or joint tenancy.  Courts 
agreeing with De Funiak’s view as to the proper construction of Family 
Code section 770(a)(2) should classify the damages based on the lost devise 
 
 253.  “The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance 
of the marriage relation are present, existing, and equal interests.”  CAL. FAM. CODE § 751 (emphasis 
added). 
 254.  Section 770 of the Family Code (emphasis added) provides: “(a) Separate property of a 
married person includes . . . (2) All property acquired by the person after marriage by . . . descent.” 
 255.  DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 42, § 69, at 154 (citing NOVISIMA RECOPLIACION DE 
LAS LEYES DE ESPANA, bk. X, cap. 4, law 1 (1805)).  See also the nineteenth-century California 
cases concerning lucrative acquisitions (which would include inheritances).  Supra note 105. 
 256.  The statute of limitations for the wrongful death could run against one of the parent co-heirs 
of the decedent but be tolled as to the other so that only he or she obtains a judgment that includes 
damages for the lost inheritance that would have been received by both.  See San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 726 (Ct. App. 2007).  That only the one parent 
was able to sue should not alter the community property classification of the recovery, as the 
plaintiff who is not time-barred should be viewed as representing the community.   
  257.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(2) (West 2004). 
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or bequest by either husband or wife alone, or by both as plaintiffs in a 
wrongful death suit (or as recipients of a settlement payment) as community 
property.258 
b.  Loss of Gifts of Cash or Other Property 
If, but for having been tortiously killed, the wrongful death decedent 
would have made gifts of property to the wife alone or to the husband alone, 
they would be the donee’s separate property;259 thus wrongful death 
damages received by a spouse based on the theory of lost gifts would be 
separate property of the claimant under in-lieu tracing.  California courts 
seem to accept the civil law rule that inter vivos gifts made by a donor to the 
husband and wife jointly are classified as community property.260  If there 
were evidence that the decedent had, for several years before dying, made 
annual gifts of $22,000 (or $24,000 or $26,000 as the annual gift tax 
exclusion increased)261 by check made out to the decedent’s child and the 
spouse of that child, a trier of fact in a wrongful death trial could well 
conclude that such a giving practice would have continued had the decedent 
not been tortiously killed.  Damages awarded to the spouses or to one of 
them based on such evidence would be community property under in-lieu 
tracing, as would an appropriate portion of a settlement payment to the 
spouses or one spouse alone made by the tortfeasor after being advised of 
such potential evidence. 
c.  Lost Earnings of a Decedent Who Was a Minor Child of 
Husband or Wife or Both 
The decedent could be a young teenager or a pre-teen who was a much-
sought-after model, screen star, musician, etc., whose tortiously-caused 
death put an end to a stream of income the young person was collecting as 
such a celebrity.  The California court of appeal held in 1939 in Santos v. 
Santos262 that the earnings of an unemancipated minor child of the husband 
or the wife, but not of both, were the separate property of the parent-
 
  258.  See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 259.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(2). 
 260.  See supra note 105. 
 261.  By doing so the decedent-donor doubles the federal gift tax annual exclusion by creating two 
donees.  See 26 U.S.C. § 2053(b) (2006).  I understand the practice to be rather common.   
 262.  89 P.2d 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).  Santos involved a putative marriage where the parties 
took out a marriage license believing in good faith that they needed to do no more to acquire lawful 
marital status.  Id. at 165.  The court applied community property law by analogy, id. at 166, so it is 
clear the result would have been the same as to ownership of the earnings of the minor child at issue 
had the marriage been lawful rather than putative.  See also section 7500(b) of the California Family 
Code section, which provides that if one parent of the minor child is dead, the surviving parent “is 
entitled” to the earnings of the minor child. 
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spouse.263  This rule should control the classification of wrongful death 
damages recovered by that parent based on such lost earnings when the 
spouse of the parent is not related to the deceased child.264  Texas has held 
that the earnings of an unemancipated minor who is the child of both the 
husband and wife are community property.265  De Funiak says that “[u]nder 
the presumption in favor of community property, certainly it must be 
presumed that this is the manner in which the parents do hold [such 
earnings] together, and this must be accepted as the rule.”266  Section 
7500(a) of the California Family Code, in stating that the parents are 
“equally entitled” to the earnings of an unemancipated child of both, does 
not specifically direct the courts to achieve such equality by classifying such 
income as community property in situations where the parents are married to 
each other and cohabitating at the time of receipt.267  Nevertheless, I am 
confident that California courts will reach that result by following Texas and 
De Funiak and that such a rule will control the classification result under in-
lieu tracing in wrongful death cases as well. 
d.  Loss of Support the Decedent Owed as a Matter of Law to the 
Spouse-Claimant 
In some situations, by statute, a child owes a duty to support his mother 
or father or both.268  If the decedent child owed such support at the time of 
his or her death or if it could be reasonably found that circumstances would 
have arisen after the wrongful death of the child that would have caused the 
decedent to owe a duty to pay financial support to his mother or father, then 
a component of a wrongful death award should include damages based on 
the loss of such support.  If the decedent were not a child of the spouse of 
the parent owed support by the child, the logic that led the Santos court to 
hold that earnings of a minor child would be the separate property of the 
 
  263.  Santos, 89 P.2d at 165.   
  264.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7500 (West 2004). 
 265.  See, e.g., Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Stratton, 287 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Tex. App.—Waco 1956) (no 
writ). 
 266.  DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 42, § 68.1, at 150.  In California, all property acquired 
during marriage is presumed to be community.  See, e.g., Rossin v. Rossin (In re Marriage of 
Rossin), 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 2009).  This presumption is said to be “fundamental” to 
the community property system.  Duncan v. Duncan (In re Duncan’s Estate), 70 P.2d 174, 179 (Cal. 
1939). 
  267.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7500(a). 
 268.  “Except as otherwise provided by law, an adult-child shall, to the extent of his or her ability, 
support a parent who is in need and unable to maintain himself or herself by work.”  CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 4400. 
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child’s parent when that parent’s spouse was not related to the child 
probably would apply to the classification of support payments owed a 
parent whose spouse was not related to the obligor.269  In both situations the 
source of the income is a relationship not connected to the marriage and one 
that very likely was established before the marriage.  Wrongful death 
damages recovered by the parent whose spouse was not related to the 
decedent would then be, under in-lieu tracing, the recipient’s separate 
property. 
How would the law classify statutorily-mandated support payments 
made by an adult-child to both of his disabled parents or to one disabled 
parent, married to the other parent of the adult-child—a parent-spouse who 
was not disabled and not entitled to support?  The payments are not gifts.  
Although in some situations a parent’s abandoning the child will forfeit the 
parent’s right to statutorily-mandated support,270 there is no requirement that 
the parent have expended money or provided labor to care for the child at 
any time for the parent to be entitled to support.271  Thus, support payments 
received do not have the character of onerous acquisitions.272  Nevertheless, 
there seems to be no separate property source, such as a right of personal 
security that arose before marriage, underlying one spouse’s or both 
spouses’ right to support from an adult-child.  It should follow, then, that the 
general presumption in favor of the community273 will apply to the support 
payments, even if made to just one spouse.  That will control the 
classification of wrongful death damages based on lost support payments. 
e.  Loss of Services the Decedent Would Have Provided 
If it is found to be reasonably likely that the decedent, if living, would 
have provided “‘services having a financial value’”274 to a wrongful death 
plaintiff, that party may recover damages equal to what it would cost to pay 
someone to perform the services.275  According to the California Supreme 
Court, these damages fall into the category of damages based on loss of 
direct financial benefits because the economic value of the services can 
 
  269.  See supra notes 262–64 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4411. 
 271.  Consider the case where the mother or father, at the time of the child’s birth, is totally 
disabled and remains so into the child’s adulthood, when the duty of support arises. 
 272.  See Washington v. Washington, 302 P.2d 569, 573 (Cal. 1956) (Carter, J., concurring) 
(community acquisitions have their source in an onerous title, i.e., they are earned by labor of a 
spouse, or both spouses, or arise out of payment of consideration that was community); DE FUNIAK 
& VAUGHN, supra note 42, § 62, at 127. 
 273.  See supra note 266. 
 274.  Corder v. Corder, 161 P.3d 172, 183 (Cal. 2007) (quoting Griffey v. Pac. Electric Ry. Co., 
209 P. 45, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922)). 
 275.  See Martin v. Mansfeldt, 223 P.2d 501, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950). 
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readily be ascertained, even though the decedent would not have provided 
money to the heir asserting the wrongful death claim.276 
The nature of the lost services will determine whether the damages 
received based on the loss thereof are classified as community or separate 
property, or a mix of both.  If at the time of death the decedent had been 
providing no-charge nursing care for his mother and did not view this 
nursing care as a gift to his mother, wrongful death damages based on the 
value of nursing services the parent ceased receiving on death of her child 
should be classified as community property.  This is because the receipt of 
the services relieved the community of an obligation to provide basic care 
for the wife/mother as a member of the community.  A community-benefit 
test is employed at divorce to classify debts as community or separate in the 
process of making an equal division of the community property,277 and it 
seems proper to borrow the community-benefit test when classifying 
wrongful death damages based on loss of services received by a spouse.  If 
the decedent would have provided services to both spouses without having 
the state of mind that a gift was being made, damages recovered based on 
the loss of such services by either spouse or both should likewise be 
community property, even if the decedent was related by blood to only one 
of the spouses. 
Can the presumption in favor of community property classification be 
overcome by evidence that the decedent, while alive, had stated that he 
considered that he or she was making a gift to his or her mother in 
performing nursing services for her, thereby raising the inference that such a 
state of mind would have continued into the future as nursing services were 
provided, had the decedent not died?  There is no clear answer.  Federal gift 
tax law does not view a gift of services as taxable on the ground that no 
property is involved.278  Section 770(a)(2) of the California Family Code 
classifies “all property” received by gift after marriage by a spouse as his or 
her separate property.  A court would probably hold that the community 
 
 276.  Corder, 161 P.3d at 183.  It would seem that a loss of “care” the decedent would have 
provided to the claimant-spouse, see Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1977), and 
“protection” that would have been so provided, Corder, 161 P.3d at 183; Krouse, 562 P.2d at 1025, 
should be included in the wrongful death damages subcategory of loss of “services,” because they 
can be valued based on the cost of hiring someone else to provide the care and protection.  But 
Krouse and Corder, without analysis, dubiously lumped these types of loss with loss of society and 
comfort. 
 277.  See Frick v. Frick (In re Marriage of Frick), 226 Cal. Rptr. 766, 774–75 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(debt on loan taken out to raise funds to pay real property taxes on realty that was owned 43.54% by 
the community, the balance being separate property of the husband, was 43.54% a community debt). 
 278.  See Comm’r v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352, 353 (10th Cir. 1947); see also 26 U.S.C. § 2501(a) 
(2006) (taxing gifts of “property”). 
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property presumption attached to wrongful death damages received during 
marriage based on a loss of gifted services cannot be overcome due to the 
absence of law viewing services as the equivalent of property. 
2.  Damages for Loss of Comfort and Society that the Decedent 
Would Have Provided 
Recall279 that a Texas court classifying wrongful death damages 
received by a spouse based on loss of society (consortium) due to the 
tortious killing of the spouse’s child found it appropriate to apply, by 
analogy, the classification previously made in a Texas case where the harm 
to the spouse was loss of consortium provided by the other spouse, resulting 
in a separate property classification.  This analogy must be rejected in 
California.  A 1995 California court of appeal decision held that damages for 
loss of spousal consortium must be classified as community property 
because they are damages for “personal injur[ies]” under what is now 
section 780 of the California Family Code.  Section 780 defines personal 
injury damages received by a spouse based on a tort occurring during 
marriage as community property.280  It has been shown, however, that the 
California legislature could not have intended any part of wrongful death 
damages to be “personal injur[ies]” to a spouse within the scope of section 
780.281  Accordingly, in-lieu tracing should be employed, if possible, to 
classify the loss of society portion of the wrongful death damages received 
by a married person. 
The society and comfort of which the claimant-spouse was deprived 
must be of a nature that could not be replaced by hiring a companion; 
otherwise, the damages would fall under the lost “services” subcategory of 
direct financial loss.282  The monetary award received for loss of society is 
based on the spouse’s loss of the joy and pleasure of interacting with a 
 
 279.  See supra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
 280.  Meighan v. Shore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744, 749 (Ct. App. 1995).  Craddock v. KMart Corp., 
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 881 (Ct. App. 2001), assumed that a community property classification would have 
been appropriate for damages claimed by a husband for loss of his wife’s consortium arising out of a 
tort, as to which the wife’s negligence was 10% of the cause of the resulting injuries.  The Craddock 
court stated that the issue it faced was whether to apply Family Code section 783, under which the 
wife’s negligence would not be imputed to the husband and would entitle him to a 100% recovery, 
or Civil Code section 1431.2, under which the tortfeasor the husband sued was liable for non-
economic damages only to the extent of his 90% of fault in causing the accident.  Id. at 888.  Section 
783, as judicially expanded to deal with comparative negligence in Lantis v. Condon, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
22, 24 (Ct. App. 1979), would not have been at issue if damages for loss of spousal consortium were 
classified as separate property, for it could not then have been contended that the negligent wife 
would have benefitted from her own wrong had the husband obtained a 100% recovery. 
 281.  See supra text accompanying notes 148–50. 
 282.  See supra text accompanying notes 274–77. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/20/2012  1:28 PM 
[Vol. 39: 865, 2012] California Wrongful Death Damages 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
917 
relative for whom the claimant has feelings of love or affection.283  Such 
good feelings are not property.  Since the loss of society damages are not 
awarded as a replacement for lost property, classic in-lieu tracing arguably 
cannot be done in this situation.  One possible judicial response to this 
conclusion is a holding with respect to the loss-of-consortium component of 
wrongful death damages that the community property presumption attaching 
to the cause of action arising during marriage, and damages flowing from it, 
cannot be overcome.  Loss of society damages would thus be community 
property, even if the decedent were not related to the spouse of the claimant 
receiving a share of such damages. 
Alternatively, California courts could trace such damages to a 
nonproprietary source, such as the capacity of the claimant-spouse to feel 
pleasure in sharing experiences with a beloved relative—the decedent.284  
Such a capacity, although not property, was possessed by the claimant-
spouse before marriage and, in that sense, is analogous to property that is 
separate because it was owned by a spouse before marriage.  Under this 
approach, the fact that the relationship of the claimant-spouse with the 
decedent did not begin until after the claimant married does not compel a 
community property classification.285  Particularly in cases where the 
decedent was not related to the person married to the party recovering 
wrongful death damages, the separate property classification seems more 
intuitively correct, since a community classification would treat the 
unrelated spouse as suffering equally along with the claimant. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The development of the in-lieu tracing doctrine—particularly as it is 
now applied in workers’ compensation cases like Raphael—requires 
overruling the 1922 Keena decision, the source of the rule that a wrongful 
 
 283.  “‘[F]actors relevant in assessing a claimed loss of society, comfort, and protection may 
include the closeness of the family unit at issue, the warmth of feeling between the family members, 
and the character of the deceased as ‘kind and attentive’ or ‘kind and loving.’”  Corder v. Corder, 
161 P.3d 172, 184 (Cal. 2007) (quoting Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Cal. 1977)). 
 284.  The Texas Supreme Court, in its decision holding damages for loss of spousal consortium to 
be separate property, said the recovery is based on “damages to the emotional interests” of the 
claimant-spouse.  Whittelsey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex. 1978). 
 285.  The illogic of making the classification turn on when the relationship began can be 
illustrated by a hypothetical case.  Wife is the aunt of two nieces, A and B, tortiously killed, leaving 
Wife as their sole heir.  A was born and began interacting with Wife six months before Wife married 
Husband; B was born and began interacting with Wife ten months after the marriage.  Surely it 
would be legally indefensible to classify Wife’s damages based on loss of society with A as her 
separate property, but damages based on loss of society with B as community. 
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death award received by a spouse must be classified as 100% community 
property.  Most components of such a wrongful death award can be traced to 
a separate source via in-lieu tracing, resulting in a separate property 
classification.  An inability to overcome the presumption that property 
acquired during marriage is community property may lead to classifying one 
or two of the possible components of the wrongful death recovery received 
by a married person as community property. 
 
